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Access to Medicine in an Era of Fractal Inequality
Frank Pasquale*
"Money pads the edges of things," said Ms. Schlegel. "God help those
who have none .... You and I ... stand upon money as upon islands. It is
so firm beneath our feet that we forget its very existence. It's only when
we see someone near us tottering that we realize all that an independent
income means."
-E.M. Forster, Howard's End1
I. INTRODUCTION
Modem medical technologies are designed not only to ease suffering but
also to enhance human powers.2 How should scarce resources be allocated
between these two goals? At first glance, any medical progress appears to
be an unqualified gain. Yet many thoughtful people worry about a health
care landscape warped by the excessive influence of money. Are disparities
in buying power diverting essential resources from the poor in order to fund
the frivolous pursuits of the wealthy? To what extent should individuals'
access to medicine depend on their purchasing power or citizenship?
These concerns are becoming increasingly important as new technologies
of medical care and bodily enhancement develop. Moral qualms can be
Loftus Professor of Law and Associate Director of the Center for Health and
Pharmaceutical Law and Policy at Seton Hall Law School; Visiting Professor of Law,
Spring, 2009, Yale Law School; Affiliate Fellow, Yale Information Society Project; Clerk,
Honorable Kermit Lipez of the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 2001-2002;
Fellow, Institute for the Defense of Competition and Protection of Intellectual Property
(Peru), 1999.
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Weilbaecher, and many students were both hospitable hosts and insightful interlocutors. This
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translated into laws which set floors (minimum access levels) and ceilings
(maximum access levels) for the purchase and use of health technology.
The desirability of such limits on the availability of technology to the poor
and rich depends in part on the legitimacy of inequality generally. Relative
deprivation in the present can lead to a better future for all, but it can also
reinforce extant inequalities.
There are two metanarrative accounts of the relationship between
inequality and health care. On a Whiggish, optimistic view, vast inequality
can generate the capital necessary to fund investment in innovative health
care technologies. Scholars like Richard Epstein have celebrated both
general economic inequality and unequal access to health care particularly
because, they claim, buying power at the top promotes investment in
medical advances. 3 Interpreted less charitably, inequality enables the well-
off to bid away resources and opportunities from the poor.4 If an anti-
baldness cure can generate billions of dollars in revenue while a new
therapy for tuberculosis only generates hundreds of millions, for-profit
pharmaceutical companies may well have a fiduciary duty to invest scarce
research dollars in hair rather than health.5 Kevin Outterson has written
3. Epstein focuses particularly on pharmaceutical innovation. Audio recording: Epstein
vs. Epstein: Drug Price Subsidies, The University of Chicago Law School Faculty Blog
(May 18, 2007), http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2007/05/epstein vs epst.html (On
May 4, 2007, Richard Epstein debated himself, in an event "billed as Epstein vs. Epstein, and
the topic was 'Why should the U.S. subsidize the world with our high prescription drug
prices?"').
4. See Jeanne Whalen, Rich Nations Lock In Flu Vaccine as Poor Ones Fret, WALL ST.
J., May 16, 2009, at A12 ("A scramble among wealthy nations to guard against a swine-flu
pandemic is raising concerns that billions of people in poorer countries could be left without
adequate supplies of vaccine.... The emerging battle between the haves and have-nots
underscores a major weakness in the global health system: Pharmaceutical companies have
severely limited capacity to produce flu vaccines in emergencies."). Inequitable access to
drugs may lead to breakdowns in the global public health system. Id. See also Martin Khor,
Indonesia's Move on Bird Flu Samples Highlights Key Access Issues, THIRD WORLD
NETWORK, Feb. 18, 2007, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/intellectualproperty/
info.service/twn.ipr.info.020714.htm ("Up to now, WHO Member States that experience
bird flu outbreaks provide samples of the virus isolates to WHO collaborating centres. At
these centres, the isolates are used in the process of creating vaccine seed stocks, frequently
using patented techniques. WHO then provides the seed stocks to vaccine producers. But the
vaccine producers, say many developing countries, are charging too much for the vaccines.
Several countries raised the issue at the World Health Assembly last May.").
5. See Kevin Outterson, The Vanishing Public Domain: Antibiotic Resistance,
Pharmaceutical Innovation and Intellectual Property Law, 67 U. PITT. L. REv. 67, 122-23
(2005) (discussing biases created by patent-centered innovation system); see also William
Fisher & Talha Syed, Global Justice in Health Care: Developing Drugs for the Developing
World, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 581, 583 (2007) (discussing geographic locations for
concentrations of pharmaceutical firm research and development); see also Michael R.
Reich, The Global Drug Gap, 287 Sc. MAG. 1979, 1979 (2000) (noting that research and
development systems remain focused primarily on the health issues of the world's affluent
countries).
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eloquently about the resulting challenges to public health, and Thomas
Pogge has highlighted the self-reinforcing deprivation that can result from
these disparities.6
Neo-classical economics has been slow to recognize the dual effects of
inequality, and even most of its critics in the behavioral economics school
have not made unequal life chances a primary concern. While thousands of
pages have been written about the balance between current access to drugs
and future innovation, economists have explored less thoroughly the
relationships between the buying power of the rich and the health status of
the poor. Quantification-minded policymakers often seek a scientific
estimate of the costs and benefits of particular policy balances. Yet the
positive and negative metanarratives of inequality are hard to
commensurate in a cost-benefit analysis: they involve long-term time
perspectives, 7 recognition of the interrelationships between politics and
markets, and multiple unintended consequences. Whether one views
inequality in health care access as fundamentally beneficial and necessary
or burdensome and contingent depends on the type of society one wants to
create; it does not depend centrally on cost-benefit analysis of different
regimes of access. Once we complement economics' prime directive of
wealth or utility maximization with other disciplinary perspectives, a new
complexity of positive and normative approaches to inequality emerges.
Philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists, historians, and many other
scholars in the social sciences and humanities can help us evaluate the
legitimacy and degree of inevitability of unequal access to medicine.
Internationally, janiform narratives of opportunity and deprivation persist
in scenarios ranging from access to doctors, organ markets, or medical
6. Outterson, supra note 5 at 123; Thomas Pogge, Why Inequality Matters, in GLOBAL
INEQUALITY 134, 143 (David Held & Ayse Kaya, eds., 2007). ("The most affluent
understand very well that their future wealth is affected by the social rules. They will
therefore generally use their influence on the design of the social rules towards defending
and expanding their advantages. The richer the top 10 percent are relative to the rest of the
population, the more their interests will differ from the interests of the rest and the greater
their influence on the design of the social rules will be relative to the influence of the
majority.").
7. Ecological economics has been grappling with these issues, but has not adequately
informed the mainstream of the field. Both health and intellectual property law could benefit
from more extensive application of principles of environmental economics. Frank Pasquale,
Toward an Ecology of Intellectual Property: Lessons from Environmental Economics for the
Valuation of Copyright's Commons, 8 YALE J. L. & TECH. 78 (2005).
8. Eric Turkheimer has recently defined social science as "the attempt to explain the
causes of complex human behavior when there are a large number of potential causes, the
potential causes are non-independent, and randomized experimentation is not possible."
Turkheimer, quoted in Steve Hsu, The Joy of Turkheimer, INFORMATION PROCESSING,
available at http://infoproc.blogspot.com/2008/10/joy-of-turkheimer.html (last visited on Jan.
15, 2010) (posting Turkheimer's slides from the talk "The Gloomy Prospect Wins;" this
definition is at slide 12).
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tourism. Domestically, scholars have questioned the level of distributive
justice of many aspects of American health care finance. 9 This essay will
discuss these debates and briefly consider some of their implications for
access to medicine generally.
Due to the expanding globalization of markets for health care, it is
increasingly necessary to engage in the simultaneous discussion of both
American and global inequality when discussing access to care. l° Several
actual and proposed programs for increasing access to care in the U.S. (such
as immigration of physicians and nurses from developing countries and
medical tourism allowing U.S. citizens to obtain care abroad) could
exacerbate access problems in less-developed countries.11 Even the least
advantaged citizens in the U.S. may exert purchasing power that draws
medical resources out of reach of citizens in the developing world.
Despite the importance of these repercussions, however, discussions of
inequality of access in the U.S. have not adequately focused on the degree
to which domestic solutions may exacerbate international problems. Part II
of this article explains one reason why: the rise of what I call "fractal
inequality," the repeatedly skewed patterns that characterize global,
domestic, and even elite distributions of income and wealth. Fractal
inequality explains why spending that seems trivial to those at the top of an
income distribution may overwhelm the purchasing power of those in the
middle, which in turn can dwarf the purchasing power of those at the
bottom. The reallocative effects of higher spending on health care by the
wealthiest can cascade down the distributive ladder.
Part III describes some of these effects in the U.S. health care sector,
modeling the rise of concierge medicine, single specialty hospitals, and
cosmetic surgery as epiphenomenal of the expansion of the purchasing
power of wealthier Americans between 1975 and 2005. Each of these
developments is part of a larger trend toward allocating medical resources
in accordance with ability to pay as opposed to medical need. This
reallocation of purchasing power has in turn spawned several stopgap
measures to assure access to the underserved in the U.S., ranging from
9. See, e.g., Steffie Woolhander & David U. Himmelstein, Paying For National Health
Insurance- AndNot Getting It, 21 HEALTH AFF. 88, 88 (2002).
10. Nathan Cortez, Patients without Borders: The Emerging Global Market for Patients
and the Evolution of Modern Health Care, 83 IND. L.J. 71, 131 (2008).
11. This worry is one facet of a more general problem that Thomas Pogge identifies:
global rules of trade and commercial exchange that systematically disadvantage the less
developed world vis a vis the more developed world. THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: COSMOPOLITAN RESPONSIBILITIES AND REFORMS 203 (Polity Press, 2002)
(discussing "radical inequality and our responsibility."). But see THOMAS POGGE AND HIS
CRITICS (Alison Jaggar, ed., Polity Press, forthcoming, 2011) (featuring essays by scholars,
including Joshua Cohen, who take issue with Pogge's characterization of responsibility for
radical inequality).
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medical tourism, to physician immigration, to promotion of "denturists" to
serve those who cannot afford dentists.
Part IV examines how U.S. purchasing power may affect the overall
global market for medical resources. While many commentators worry that
a "brain drain" is afflicting residents of the nations from which physicians
emigrate, others claim that remittances from emigrant physicians ultimately
aid their nations of origin. Medical tourism has dual effects as well, both
diverting doctors away from indigenous populations and supplying capital
that may build health infrastructure in those nations.
In Part V, I examine some policy proposals designed to reduce the
diversionary effect of global trade in medical resources and services while
promoting its more positive outcomes. Though regulation is often the
fastest way to stop certain exchanges from occurring, it can simultaneously
be too blunt and too porous an instrument to achieve egalitarian policy
goals. If properly targeted and allocated toward medical innovation,
taxation of payments to concierge and cosmetic physicians, immigrant
medical personnel, specialty hospitals, and purchasers of foreign organs
may generate funding that assures better access to care in our fractally
unequal world, along with the development of technology that will ease
scarcity. Part VI concludes with some reflections on the strain that fractal
inequality puts on notions of value, desert, and justice generally.
II. DEFINING FRACTAL INEQUALITY
A fractal is a shape that exhibits repeating patterns of "self-similarity"-
the shape of the whole is observed both in its parts, and in parts of its
parts. 12 Though they are not as reticulated as fractals observed in nature or
geometry, patterns of income distribution also replicate at various levels
what I call "fractal inequality." Just as distribution among rich and poor
12. BENOIT B. MANDELBROT, THE FRACTAL GEOMETRY OF NATURE 18 (1982) (most
fractals are scaling, and thus exhibit invariance "under certain transformations of scale.").
See also MITCHELL WALDROP, COMPLEXITY: THE EMERGING SCIENCE AT THE EDGE OF ORDER
13 (1992); David G. Post & Michael B. Eisen, How Long is the Coastline of the Law?
Thoughts on the Fractal Nature of Legal Systems, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 545, 546-47 (2000)
("Fractals comprise a class of geometric figures that share some rather unusual
characteristics. Although there is no generally accepted definition for the term, fractals can
generally be characterized as complicated figures of infinite length that do not simplify when
magnified, that is, whose structure repeats itself at all scales."); Nicholas Taleb, The Fourth
Quadrant: A Map of the Limits of Statistics, EDGE: THE THIRD CULTURE, Sept. 15, 2008,
http://www.edge.org/3rd culture/taleb08/taleb08 index.html ("There are two classes of
probability domains-very distinct qualitatively and quantitatively. The first, thin-tailed
'Mediocristan,' the second, thick tailed 'Extremistan'... Mediocristan corresponds to
"random walk" style randomness that you tend to find in regular textbooks (and in popular
books on randomness). Extremistan corresponds to a 'random jump' one. The first kind I can
call 'Gaussian-Poisson,' the second 'fractal' or Mandelbrotian (after the works of the great
Benoit Mandelbrot linking it to the geometry of nature).").
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countries is extremely unequal, distribution within many of these countries,
including the U.S., is also extremely unequal. Generalizable studies of
inequality are possible in part because of the fractal nature of the
distribution of wealth and income.
A. Patterns of Income and Wealth Distribution
A few striking figures confirm the broad outlines of a fractal pattern of
income and wealth distribution. After reviewing global economic figures,
Thomas Pogge has concluded that:
Though constituting 44 percent of the world's population, the 2,735
million people the World Bank counts as living below its... $2 per day
international poverty line consume only 1.3 percent of the global
product.... The high-income countries, with 955 million citizens, by
contrast, have about 81 percent of the global product.
13
We are used to hearing about 80/20 distributions (e.g., 20% of
individuals in an organization may do 80% of the work), but as Pogge
notes, that pattern understates the degree of global inequality, where
roughly 15% of citizens enjoy 81% of global product and the bottom two
fifths can barely access more than one percent of global product.
14
One might object that prices are lower in poorer countries, so such
figures obscure real economic conditions. W. Michael Cox and Richard
Alm have argued that gross inequality in income does not necessarily
translate into gross inequality in consumption.15 Nevertheless, even when
such figures are adjusted to reflect the real purchasing power of individuals,
they still reveal extreme disparities. As Branko Milanovic has documented:
The top 5 percent of individuals in the world receive about 1/3 of total
world ([Purchasing Power Parity]-valued) income, and the top 10 percent
one-half. If we take the bottom 5 and 10 percent, they receive
respectively 0.2 and 0.7 percent of world total income. This means that
the ratio between the average income received by the richest 5 percent
13. Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 19 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 1, 1
(2005); see also Why Inequality Matters, supra note 6, at 137 (arguing that increased
economic inequality leads to increased political inequality).
14. POGGE, supra note 11, at 1.
15. W. Michael Cox & Richard Alm, You Are What You Spend, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,
2008 at A12 ("[J]f we compare the incomes of the top and bottom fifths, we see a ratio of 15
to 1. If we turn to consumption, the gap declines to around 4 to 1."). Cox and Alm's focus on
consumer goods like VCR's and cell phones itself obscures large and growing inequalities in
access to goods and services like health care, retirement and college savings, and reasonable
commutes, and the dangerous debtloads accumulated by the poor and near-poor. ALAN
TONELSON, THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM: WHY A WORLDWIDE WORKER SURPLUS AND
UNCONTROLLED FREE TRADE ARE SINKING AMERICAN LIVING STANDARDS 21 (Westview
Press, 2002) (critiquing Alm and Cox).
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and the poorest 5 percent of people in the world is 165 to 1. The richest
people earn in about 48 hours as much as the poorest people earn in a
16year.
Milanovic calculates that "[s]ome 70 percent of global inequality is
'explained' by differences in countries' mean incomes." 17 In other words,
most of the individuals in wealthy countries are much better off than most
of the individuals in poor countries. But even within the U.S., one of the
world's wealthiest countries, a dramatic tiering of incomes is prevalent.
Many authors have chronicled rising levels of wealth and income inequality
in the U.S. 18 Charles Morris has described the fractal nature of these
differences in a compelling way, and his account is worth quoting at some
length:
Between 1980 and 2005, the top tenth of the population's share of all
taxable income went from 34 percent to 46 percent, an increase of about a
third. The changing distribution within the top 10 percent, however, is
what's truly remarkable. The unlucky folks in the 90th to the 95th
percentiles actually lost a little ground, while those in the 95th to 99th
gained a little.
Overall, however, income shares in the 90th to 99th percentile population
were basically flat (24 percent in 1980 and 26 percent in 2005). Almost
all the top one-tenth's share gains, in other words, went to the top 1
percent, or the top "centile," who doubled their share of national cash
16. Branko Milanovic, Global Income Inequality: What It Is and Why It Matters?
WORLD ECON. (forthcoming Dec. 2005) (manuscript at 15), http://www.carnegieendowment.
org/files/Milanovicworldecon.pdf.
17. Id.
18. See generally DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, FREE LUNCH: HOW THE WEALTHIEST
AMERICANS ENRICH THEMSELVES AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE (AND STICK YOU WITH THE BILL)
(2007); JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT; THE ASSAULT ON AMERICAN JOBS,
FAMILIES, HEALTH CARE, AND RETIREMENT AND How You CAN FIGHT BACK (2006); ROBERT
FRANK, FALLING BEHIND (2007); John Bellamy Foster, Aspects of Class in the United States:
An Introduction, MONTHLY REV. 1, 2 (July-Aug. 2006) ("Over the years 1950 to 1970, for
each additional dollar made by those in the bottom 90 percent of income earners, those in the
top 0.01 percent received an additional $162. In contrast, from 1990 to 2002, for every added
dollar made by those in the bottom 90 percent, those in the uppermost 0.01 percent (today
around 14,000 households) made an additional $18,000."); David Cay Johnston, Op-Ed,,
Richest Are Leaving Even the Rich Far Behind, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2005, at 11; Teresa
Tritch, Op-Ed., The Rise of the Super-Rich, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2006, available at
http://select.nytimes.com/2006/07/19/opinion/19talkingpoints.html?_r-l. ("[F]rom 2003 to
2004, the latest year for which there is data ... real average income for the top 1 percent of
households - those making more than $315,000 in 2004 - grew by nearly 17 percent.... In
all, the top 1 percent of households enjoyed 36 percent of all income gains in 2004, on top of
an already stunning 30 percent in 2003.") Tritch's work and a larger series in the Times
focused on the degree to which inequality even within rarefied sectors of the economy grew
during the 1990s and 2000s. Id. "Income inequality used to be about rich versus poor, but
now it's increasingly a matter of the ultra rich and everyone else." Id.
2010]
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income from 9 percent to 19 percent.
Even within the top centile, however, the distribution of gains was
radically skewed. Nearly 60 percent of it went to the top tenth of 1
percent of the population, and more than a fourth of it to the top one-
hundredth of 1 percent of the population. Overall, the top tenth of 1
percent more than tripled their share of cash income to about 9 percent,
while the top one-hundredth of 1 percent, or fewer than 15,000 taxpayers,
quadrupled their share to 3.6 percent of all taxable income. Among those
15,000, the average tax return reported $26 million of income in 2005,
while the take for the entire group was $384 billion. 19
Larry Bartels's book, Unequal Democracy, graphs these trends over a
longer time period (from 1947 to 2005).20 He shows how over those 58
years the 95th percentile did much better than those at lower percentiles.21
He then shows how those at the 99.99th percentile did spectacularly better
than those at the 99.9th, 99.5th , 9 9th , and 9 5 h percentiles.22 There is some
evidence that even within that top 99 .99 h percentile, inequality reigned. In
2005, the "Fortunate 400"-the 400 households with the highest earnings in
the U.S.-made on average $213.9 million apiece, and the cutoff for entry
into this group was a $100 million income-about four times the average
income of $26 million prevailing in the top 15,000 returns.23
Taken as a group, Pogge, Milanovic, Bartels, and Morris paint a picture
of a world in which those in the richest countries have far more income than
those in poor countries. Moreover, the most fortunate in the richest
countries-particularly those in the top centile of the income distribution-
are far richer than those around them. Most dramatically, even within that
top centile, the richest of the rich (at the 99 .99 h percentile and "Fortunate
400" levels) are pulling away from even their elite peers. Like fractals, the
19. CHARLES MORRIS, THE TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN: EASY MONEY, HIGH ROLLERS,
AND THE GREAT CREDIT CRASH,139-140 (2008); see also EDWARD N. WOLFF: TOP HEAVY:
THE INCREASING INEQUALITY OF WEALTH IN AMERICAN AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT
36 (2002) ("wealth inequality in the United States is high by international standards.").
20. LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW
GILDED AGE 8, 10 (2008), available at http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s8664.pdf
21. Id. at 8.
22. Id. at 10.
23. Tom Herman, There's Rich, and There's the "'Fortunate 400, " WALL ST. J., Mar. 5,
2008, at Dl, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 120468366051012473.html ("[T]he
top 400 taxpayers have greatly increased their share of individuals' income since the mid-
1990s.... The new data actually understate the group of 400's remarkable performance. The
income yardstick used by the IRS for its study is known as 'adjusted gross income,' and it
doesn't include tax-exempt interest income from state and local government bonds."). For
background, see Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States,
1913-1998, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1 (2003); Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, The Evolution of
Top Incomes: A Historical and International Perspective, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 200, 204
(2006).
[Vol. 19
2010] Access to Medicine in an Era of Fractal Inequality 277
patterns of distribution repeat, again and again, from the global view to that
of the distribution among the most fortunate.
John Chung has characterized today's extraordinary concentrations of
wealth as a "death of reference" in our monetary system and its replacement
with "a total relativity. 24 He notes that "In 2007, the average amount of
annual compensation for the top 25 highest paid hedge fund managers was
$892 million., 25 Even before the financial crisis, it was hard to believe that
any of these individuals made over 17,800 times the economic contribution
26
of, say, a plumber making $50,000 per year. As Brad Delong has
calculated, "not even the richest of the pre-Civil War southern slaveholders
disposed of' the property in the hands of today's billionaires.27
Just as the market is preceded by law, money's worth hinges on its
ability to value past actions and to exert force over the future.2 s Money is
legitimate to the extent it is distributed wisely and fairly; money is valuable
to the extent it grants purchasing power. Given the high levels of United
States and world inequality reached in recent years, the legitimacy of fiat
money generally-and the dollar in particular-may be declining.2 9 If this
legitimization crisis continues, its power might also fade. In the meantime,
policymakers must continue to refine the many redistributive aspects of
health care law and policy that mitigate the impact of wealth and poverty on
access to care.30
24. John Chung, Money as Simulacrum: The Legal Nature and Reality of Money, 5
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL 109, 149 (2009).
25. Id, at 151. If the $892,000,000 per-year hedge fund manager and the $50,000-a-year
plumber were to come to a store at the end of a year of work, and bid for its contents, does it
really make sense to give the former 17,839/17,840 of its goods, and the latter 1/17,840 of
them? If not, perhaps we should be even more wary of further expansion of the purchasing
power of the well-off in the realm of medical personnel and services.
26. Martin Wolf, Why Britain has to Curb Finance, FIN. TIMES, May 21, 2009
(describing how many tycoons in the financial sector "now sit on fortunes earned in
activities that have led to unprecedented rescues and the worst recession since the 1930s.").
27. J. Bradford DeLong, Robber Barons, http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/
Econ Articles/Carnegie/DeLongMoscowpaper2.html.
28. I use the term "worth" here to try to overcome the classic "value/values" divide
between economics and sociology. See DAVID STARK, THE SENSE OF DISSONANCE:
ACCOUNTS OF WORTH N ECONOMIC LIFE 7 (Princeton U.P., 2009) ("The polysemic character
of the term-worth-signals concern with fundamental problems of value while recognizing
that all economies have a moral component.").
29. Branko Milanovic, Two Views on the Cause of the Global Crisis I, YALE GLOBAL
ONLINE, May 4, 2009, available at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=12327 ("The
real cause of the crisis lies in huge inequalities in income distribution which generated much
larger investable funds than could be profitably employed. The political problem of
insufficient economic growth of the middle class was then 'solved' by opening the
floodgates of the cheap credit.").
30. For a classic treatment of the distinct distributive logic applying to health and
medicine, see MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY 86 (Basic Books, 1983) ("the distributive logic of the practice of medicine seems
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B. Fractal Inequality and Purchasing Power
The practical effect of fractal inequality is clear, but what are the specific
implications for health policy? One economist, David Dapice, has made a
direct connection between overspending on health care in the U.S. and lack
of investment opportunities abroad. Yet the chain of cause and effect
between excess buying power on one end of the distribution and deprivation
at the other end is not specified to health care in Dapice's model:
US healthcare costs are nearly double that of other developed nations,
and are without any attendant benefits: US life expectancy is no
greater.... In one sense, the US is starving investment in growth by
swallowing up so much of the world's savings. With a lower budget
deficit, capital flows that are directed to funding US debt might now go
toward developing nations...31
Others have made this connection in the case of food, and their
reflections may have some relevance for health as well. In the book Stuffed
and Starved, Raj Patel notes the startling incongruity evident in the
"simultaneous existence of nearly one billion who are malnourished and
nearly one billion who are overweight." 32 For Patel, the two groups'
disparate ecological footprints explain much of this paradox of excess and
deprivation.33 Jared Diamond summarizes the broader consumption data
provocatively:
The estimated one billion people who live in developed countries have a
relative per capita consumption rate of 32. Most of the world's other 5.5
billion people constitute the developing world, with relative per capita
consumption rates below 32, mostly down toward 1... A real problem
for the world is that each of us 300 million Americans consumes as much
as 32 Kenyans. With 10 times the population, the United States consumes
320 times more resources than Kenya does.
34
The convertibility of food to fuel helps explain the connection between
excess in the developed world and deprivation in the developing world. As
Lester Brown explains, "almost everything we eat can be converted into
to be this: that care should be proportionate to illness and not to wealth.").
31. David Dapice, Stopping the Death Spiral: US Health Care Reform Can Help the
World, YALE GLOBAL ONLINE, May 26, 2009, http://www.yaleglobal.yale.edu/print/5660.
32. RAJ PATEL, STUFFED AND STARVED: THE HIDDEN BATTLE FOR THE WORLD FOOD
SYSTEM 3 (2007). See also RAJ PATEL, THE VALUE OF NOTHING: HOW To RESHAPE MARKET
SOCIETY AND REDEFINE DEMOCRACY (2009).
33. Id.
34. Jared Diamond, Op-Ed., What's Your Consumption Factor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2,
2008, at A17. See also PETER MENZEL & FAITH D'ALUISIo, HUNGRY PLANET: WHAT THE
WORLD EATS (2008) (providing images from countries across the globe of the relative access
to foodstuffs of households at varying income levels).
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automotive fuel.. .as crops that have long sustained us are diverted to
provide fuel, we may encounter.. .a battle between the world's 800 million
automobile owners, who want to maintain their mobility, and the world's 2
billion poorest people, who simply want to survive. 3 5 The rise in
commodity prices and general scarcity of food and fuel in mid-2008
generated renewed interest in Malthusian arguments about the inevitability
of resource-based conflicts.36
In the case of medical care, such direct, zero-sum competitions for
resources also exist. However, they are more directly counterbalanced by
the diffusion of innovations initially funded by the wealthy, which
gradually become available to the less well off.37 Deeper problems arise
when irreconcilably zero-sum competitions for resources develop.38 For
example, if there are only a fixed number of primary care doctors in a given
area, the demand of a few wealthy people for "concierge medicine" may
reduce the number of hours of care available to others.39 If the budget for
pharmaceutical research is limited, and researchers must determine whether
to develop a drug for a disease commonly experienced in the developed
35. Lester R. Brown, Starving the People To Feed the Cars, WASH. POST, Sep. 10, 2006,
at B03. See also Lester R. Brown, Could Food Shortages Bring Down Civilization, ScI. AM.,
May 2009, at 50, available at http://www.scientificamerican.comarticle.cfin?id=
civilization-food-shortages ("As demand for food rises faster than supplies are growing, the
resulting food-price inflation puts severe stress on the governments of countries already
teetering on the edge of chaos."); see also MICHAEL T. KLARE, RESOURCE WARS: THE NEW
LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL CONFLICT 6 (2007) (describing how the rise in commodity prices and
general scarcity of food and fuel has generated renewed interest in Malthusian arguments
about the inevitability of resource-based conflicts).
36. KLARE, supra note 35, at 6 ("the protection of global resource flows is becoming an
increasingly prominent feature of American security policy").
37. Frank Pasquale, Technology, Competition, and Values, 8 MrTNN. J. L. Sci. & TECH.
607, 607 (2007) ("Law can advance or retard the distributive effects of innovation and its
diffusion in many ways.").
38. HAROLD JAMES, THE CREATION AND DESTRUCTION OF VALUE: THE GLOBALIZATION
CYCLE 30 (Harvard U.P., 2009) (arguing that the "Western middle class... is now extremely
alarmed by the prospect that that it might be overtaken by an even larger (and harder
working) middle class in emerging market countries, especially because it is contending at
the same time with a large and widening gulf between its potential for acquiring wealth and
that already achieved by a new global elite.").
39. Troyen A. Brennan, Luxury Primary Care: Market Innovation or Threat to Access?,
346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1165, 1165 (2002); Sandra J. Carnahan, Law, Medicine, and Wealth:
Does Concierge Medicine Promote Health Care Choice, or Is It a Barrier to Access?, 17
STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 121, 157 (2006); Frank Pasquale, The Three Faces of Retainer Care:
Crafting a Tailored Regulatory Response, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 39, 80
(2007). See also Maggie Mahar, et al, The Healthcare Crisis - Solved?, THE CONFERENCE
BOARD, Sep.-Oct. 2006, available at http://www.conference-board.org/articles/
atbarticle.cfm?id=363&pg=2 ("While Toyota can step up production of its best models,
doctors cannot manufacture more hours in their day. We need to identify the processes
associated with outstanding outcomes and move the entire bell curve of doctors to the
right.").
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world or a disease commonly experienced in the developing world, the
buying power of the former may draw investigators away from the latter.
By examining the extent of such dynamics (and countervailing factors) at
the national and international level, we can begin to understand some
implications of fractal inequality for health law and policy.
III. FRACTAL INEQUALITY AND THE DOMESTIC TIERING OF
ACCESS TO CARE
The U.S. health care system exhibits excess and deprivation that reflect
larger trends toward fractal inequality. 40 The deprivation is clearly
problematic: over 45 million Americans lack health insurance and the
Institute of Medicine estimates that at least 18,000 deaths per year are
directly related to un- and under-insurance. 41 Excess can also hurt, for
American breakthroughs in medical technology are often accompanied by
waste and overtreatment.42 Shannon Brownlee's book, Overtreated, argues
that the U.S. "spends between one fifth and one third of our health care
dollars ... on care that does nothing to improve our health., 43 One reviewer
notes that "too much medicine-for many patients, much of the time-is
doing serious damage to the nation's health:"
Many treatments that have become widely accepted in recent years -
including proton pump inhibitors for ulcers, arthroscopic knee surgery for
arthritis, hormone replacement therapy for menopause and high-dose
chemotherapy for breast cancer - "have ultimately been shown to be
unnecessary, ineffective, more dangerous than imagined, or sometimes
40. Alain Enthoven & Richard. Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the
1990s: Universal Health Insurance in a System Designed to Promote Quality and Economy
(First of Two Parts), 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 29,29 (1989).
41. Timothy Jost, Our Broken Healthcare System and How to Fix It: An Essay on
Health Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 537, 537 (2006); INST. OF MED., CARE WITHOUT
COVERAGE: Too LITTLE, Too LATE 161, 162 (2002), available at http://www.nap.edu/
books/0309083435/html (reporting the 18,000 deaths).
42. Uwe E. Reinhardt, The United States: Breakthroughs and Waste, 17 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y&L. 637, 638 (1992).
43. Amanda Schaffer, Where Does It Hurt?, WASH. POST., Jan. 13, 2008, at BW02. See
also Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, THE NEW YORKER, June 1, 2009, at 36 ("Two
economists working at Dartmouth, Katherine Baicker and Amitabh Chandra, found that the
more money Medicare spent per person in a given state the lower that state's quality ranking
tended to be. In fact, the four states with the highest levels of spending-Louisiana, Texas,
California, and Florida-were near the bottom of the national rankings on the quality of
patient care."). But see Richard A. Cooper, More is More and Less is Less: The Case of
Mississippi, 28 HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE w124, w124 (2008) ("[I]t turns out that
Mississippi doesn't spend more on health care. Baicker and Chandra's metric was Medicare,
which is not a proxy for spending overall, a fact that is broadly accepted despite Skinner and
colleagues' strenuous rebuttal.").
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more deadly than the diseases they were intended to treat."4
Yet at the same time as this "excess" is sapping the health of those who
can afford it, deprivation haunts the poor and uninsured.45 Consider the
decline of the cash-strapped Grady Hospital of Atlanta:
A third of the ambulances need to be put out of their misery, said Astria
L. Benton, a paramedic supervisor. Every week or so, a vehicle simply
gives out while in transit, and Ms. Benton prays that the patient will not
die before she can orchestrate a rescue.... The orthopedic department
has a waiting list for elective procedures that one doctor quantified as
"infinity." Its doctors intermittently instruct other departments to not send
them patients.
46
While individuals across northern Georgia use the hospital, only "Fulton
and DeKalb counties... and none of their suburban neighbors - make
annual appropriations to the hospital's budget for the care of indigent
residents., 47 Perhaps the suburban counties' residents' anti-tax fervor arises
in part from a perceived need to keep the money necessary to pay for the
types of unnecessary treatments Brownlee describes.
Admittedly, much of the care offered at the high end of the American
health care system is worthwhile. However, increasingly aggressive
business strategies of doctors, hospitals, and pharmaceutical companies
threaten the delicate balance of cross-subsidization that has historically
provided adequate health care to a broad swathe of Americans.48 For
example, by diverting away the best-insured patients from general hospitals,
specialty hospitals threaten to further undermine the already fading patterns
of cross-subsidization that have aided un- and underinsured Americans. 49 A
44. Schaffer, supra note 43.
45. See Lawrence E. Singer, Gloria Jean Ate Catfood Tonight: Justice and the Social
Compact for Health Care in America, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 613, 614 (2005) ("More than
forty-three million people lack insurance. For them there are few health care options.
'Dermabrasion,' 'Botox,' and 'therapeutic massage' are not in their vocabulary.").
46. Shalia Dewan & Kevin Sack, A Safety-Net Hospital Falls Into Financial Crisis,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 8, 2008.
47. Id According to the article, "two in 10 Grady inpatients and one in 10 outpatients
arrive from" counties that do not contribute in the manner that Fulton and DeKalb do. Id.
48. See generally JOINT FTC-DOJ REPORT, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF
COMPETITION (2006), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarerpt.pdf
(accounting the role of cross-subsidization in health care finance); TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS
JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONSUMER-DRIVEN MOVEMENT (2007).
49. Sujit Choudhry, Niteesh K. Choudhry, & Troyen A. Brennan, Specialty Versus
Community Hospitals: What Role For The Law?, HEALTH AFF. WEB ExcuSivE w5-361, w5-
363 http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/abstract/hlthaff.w5.361vl ("The AHA
[American Hospital Association] argues that specialty hospitals erode cross-subsidization by
'cherry-picking' relatively well-insured and healthy patients (where profit margins are
higher) and by limiting or denying care outright to underinsured, indigent, and less healthy
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general hospital will often cross-subsidize vital public services (like
emergency departments or uncompensated care) from the margins achieved
by its cardiac or orthopedics department. When such profitable departments
migrate away from the general hospital, it is not easy to find alternative
funding for such services. Specialty hospitals often do not provide the type
of community benefits-including emergency rooms, unsponsored care, or
medical education-offered by many competing general hospitals. They
can more easily avoid serving Medicaid patients, costly Medicare patients,
and the uninsured than most general community hospitals can.50
Concierge medicine offers another example of market-driven inequality
percolating into the health sector. In exchange for a yearly retainer
payment, patients can now sign up for concierge practices, which promise
to offer them superior levels of service and attention. For example, Dr.
Steven Flier and his partners transitioned their practice into Personal
Physicians HealthCare in 2000.51 They cut their number of patients by two-
thirds or more, offering a very high level of primary and preventive care to
the first three hundred patients willing to pay a $4000 annual fee.52 Patients
unable to pay the retainer fee were left to find another physician. A similar
dynamic has played out in many other practices where patients are trading
enhanced access for cash - a clear example of queue-jumping relative to
their previous business practices and the standard of primary care prevalent
in the United States.53
Paying higher prices for higher quality services may seem like a
cornerstone of free market economics. In an ordinary market, when demand
increases, suppliers can enter in response to high prices. Competition
among suppliers-and concomitant technological innovation-may
eventually drive prices down. Yet medicine is no ordinary market.
54
Information asymmetries, often urgent and unpredictable demand, high risk
decision-making, and general uncertainty cripple market mechanisms in
patients.").
50. See John K. Iglehart, The Emergence of Physician-Owned Specialty Hospitals, 352
NEW ENG. J. MED. 78, 83 (2005); see generally Frank Pasquale, Ending the Specialty
Hospital Wars: A Plea for Pilot Programs as Information-Forcing Regulatory Design, in
OUR FRAGMENTED HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS (Einer Elhauge, ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press, forthcoming 2010).
51. Gregory Stoller & Christopher Ferrarone, Personal Physicians HealthCare: The
Patient is Always Right, 2 (2004), available at http://www.bc.edu/schools/csom/bcbi/meta-
elements/pdf/persphy.pdf.
52. Id. at 7.
53. See The Three Faces of Retainer Care, supra note 39, at 49-50.
54. Donald R. Cohodes, Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit: Musings on the
Regulation/Competition Dialogue, 7 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 54, 56 (1982) ("Medical
care has a number of characteristics that distinguish it from most other products in important
ways.").
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health care.5 5 As Donald R. Cohodes has observed, agency problems, third-
party payment, and retrospective cost reimbursement "undercut virtually all
normal incentives for market efficiency. 56
State action erodes the force of market mechanisms in medical care even
more dramatically than it does in most other fields. Given the degree of
state control over supply (and subvention for demand) in health care, it is
difficult even to recognize a "market" for key medical services. As Nobel
Laureate Milton Friedman noted long ago,57 the supply of doctors is strictly
controlled in the United States.58 During much of its history, the American
Medical Association has worked to limit the number of medical schools and
to cap the number of doctors immigrating to the U.S. 59 Regardless of
whether these limits are characterized as self-serving cartelization or as a
form of consumer protection, they effectively mean that an increase in the
buying power of one group directed toward physician services threatens to
divert care away from those unable to match its financial strength.6 °
This dynamic is increasingly important as health care becomes more
tiered.61 Innovations like specialty hospitals, retainer medicine, and
55. Id. at 56-58.
56. Id. at 58.
57. Milton Friedman, Medical Licensure, FREEDOM DAILY, Jan. 1994, at 1, available at
http://www.fff.org/freedom/0194e.asp ("[L]icensure is the key to the control that the medical
profession can exercise over the number of physicians."). See also DEAN BAKER, THE
CONSERVATIVE NANNY STATE 19 (Ctr. For Econ. Policy Research, 2006) ("In 1997 Congress
tightened the licensing rules for foreign doctors entering the country because of concerns by
the American Medical Association and other doctors' organizations that the inflow of
foreign doctors was driving down their salaries. As a result, the number of foreign medical
residents allowed to enter the country each year was cut in half.").
58. See generally Katherine Mangan, A Growth Spurt for Medical Schools, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 12, 2007, at A27.
59. See KENNETH M. LUDMERER, A TIME TO HEAL: AMERICAN MEDICAL EDUCATION
FROM THE TURN OF THE CENTURY TO THE ERA OF MANAGED CARE 214 (1999) (discussing the
role of the Liaison Committee on Medical Education, "established in 1942 as a cooperative
effort of the Association of American Medical Colleges and the Council on Medical
Education and Hospitals of the American Medical Association.").
60. See Lorne Sossin, Towards a Two-Tier Constitution? The Poverty of Health Rights,
in ACCESS TO CARE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: THE LEGAL DEBATE OVER PRIVATE HEALTH
INSURANCE IN CANADA 161, 175 (Colleen Flood et al. eds., 2005) (discussing the Chaoulli
decision guaranteeing a constitutional right to purchase private health insurance); see also
Colleen Flood et al., Finding Health Policy "Arbitrary:' The Evidence on Waiting, Dying,
and Two-Tier Systems, in ACCESS TO CARE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: THE LEGAL DEBATE OVER
PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE IN CANADA 296, 305-10 (Colleen Flood, et al., eds., 2005)
(using comparative data to demonstrate that a "two-tier system" can lead to a diversion of
health care to the wealthy); see also The Three Faces of Retainer Care, supra note 39, at
148-50 (describing how concierge medical services can lead to the effective abandonment of
patients unable or unwilling to pay retainers).
61. See John V. Jacobi, After Managed Care: Gray Boxes, Tiers And Consumerism, 47
ST. Louis U. L.J. 397, 400-01 (2003). ("[H]ealth insurance offerings are stratifying into tiers
in two ways. Employers, who until recently had been paring down the number of plans
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cosmetic surgery may provide new options for the wealthy and well-
insured. But they also have the potential to disrupt the delicate balance of
cross-subsidization that has historically provided some backstop of health
care to disadvantaged Americans. For instance, specialty hospitals often do
not provide the type of emergency rooms or medical education offered by
competing general hospitals.
A. Cosmetic Surgery and Access to Care
On first glance, cosmetic surgery and related procedures may seem like
an odd topic of concern for legal medicine. However, this $15 billion per
year industry exemplifies the dangers of tiered access to care.62 Even as the
U.S. lags in quality indicators in many forms of basic medical care, 63 it is
excelling at a range of services designed to make people "better than
well." 64 The new technologies of medical enhancement have primarily
appealed to patients with disposable income. Doctors are increasingly
looking for a way to opt out of the labyrinthine paperwork of third-party
payment systems. Unburdened by third-party payors' cost-cutting crusade,
the cosmetic surgery industry has expanded for many reasons:
There are fewer doctors overall, yet there are more doctors practicing
cosmetic plastic surgery. Why? The beauty of cosmetic plastic surgery is
that it is elective... The surgeon doesn't have to deal with annoying
insurance companies. The surgeon sets the fees. There is no cost
offered to employees, are now sometimes offering a menu of plans, from more expensive
(but less restrictive) to less expensive (but more restrictive). In addition, plan sponsors are
expanding the use of differentiation among participating providers by charging lower
member co-payments for services rendered at less expensive (or otherwise preferred)
providers.").
62. Natasha Singer, Botox Appointments Faster than for Moles, Study Finds, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 2007 ("Patients seeking an appointment with a dermatologist to ask about a
potentially cancerous mole have to wait substantially longer than those seeking Botox for
wrinkles, a study published online yesterday by The Journal of the American Academy of
Dermatology said."); ALEX KUCZYNSKI, BEAUTY JUNKIES: INSIDE OUR $15 BILLION
OBSESSION WITH COSMETIC SURGERY 8 (2006) (describing the rapid growth of the beauty
industry).
63. See Catherine Arnst, The Doc's In, but It'll Be a While, Bus. WEEK, June 22, 2007,
available at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/un2007/tc20070621 716260
.htm?chan search. (reporting on a Commonwealth Fund study: "[W]aiting times in the U.S.
are often as bad or worse as those in other industrialized nations-despite the fact that the
U.S. spends considerably more per capita on health care than any other country.. Of the
countries surveyed, 81% of patients in New Zealand got a same or next-day appointment for
a nonroutine visit, 71% in Britain, 69% in Germany, 66% in Australia, 47% in the U.S., and
36% in Canada.").
64. See generally, ERIK PARENS, ED., ENHANCING HUMAN TRAITS: ETHICAL AND SOCIAL
IMPLICATIONS (1998); CARL ELLIOTT, BETTER THAN WELL: AMERICAN MEDICINE MEETS THE
AMERICAN DREAM (2003).
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containment. And it's all paid up front, in cash.
65
Surgery is but one part of a fast-growing "beauty business[es]" that now
includes Botox injections (to paralyze certain wrinkle-generating facial
muscles) and other medical procedures designed to increase facial
volume.66
Growth in cosmetic surgery has both static and dynamic effects on the
supply of medical services. Because positional competition makes cosmetic
surgery ever more necessary as it spreads, it threatens to induce its own
demand as it becomes more prevalent.67 Standards of appearance are largely
set by context: a perfectly acceptable suit for everyday business at the office
may be hopelessly inadequate for a job interview.68 Similarly, once certain
65. Id. As Kuczynski further observes, "Saving lives is noble, but doing so while
fending off insurance carriers, monitoring costs, and paying huge insurance premiums is
another matter. Cosmetic surgery has become an asylum for physicians defecting from an
industry run by managed care in favor of the independence they hope to command in the free
market. As a result, its economics have changed, as physicians, finance companies, and
credit bureaus collaborate to extend their services to a wider sector of the population." Id.
Note that the regulatory options discussed in Part III below may accelerate this "flight to the
superficial." See Natasha Singer, More Doctors Turning to the Business of Beauty, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 30, 2006, at Al; Rebecca Mead, Proud Flesh: The Cult of Cosmetic Surgery,
THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 13, 2006 ("Kuczynski argues that the soaring incidence of cosmetic
surgery-a nearly fivefold increase in the number of cosmetic procedures performed on
Americans during the past decade-has been driven by market forces rather than by the
measurable health needs of the nation. Surgeons exhausted by the medical-insurance morass
are flocking to the field. 'If you're a doctor working in this kind of environment, do you
want to spend an hour removing a freckle and get paid $12 in two months by some insurance
company? Or do you want to spend fifteen minutes putting Botox into someone's face and
get $1,000 in cash five minutes later?' one attendee at a convention of plastic surgeons
asks.").
66. See Jonathan van Meter, About-Face, N.Y. MAG., Aug. 3, 2008, at 6, available at
http://nymag.com/news/features/48948/ (describing new trend of facial fillers, and
concluding that "[I]t was only a matter of time before a certain segment of the female
population would figure out how to have it both ways, even if it means working out two
hours a day and then paying someone to volumize their faces, as they say in the dermatology
business.").
67. See Martin Hollis, Positional Goods, in PHIL. & PRAC. 97, 97 (A. Phillips Griffiths,
ed., 1985) ("A positional good is one which a person values only on condition that not
everyone has it. Prizes, for instance, are worthless, if shelled out to all, and much of what we
seek has this exclusive character."). I have attempted to refine this definition in a recent
piece on the role of commodification in positional competition; most goods have both
positional and intrinsic value, and it is therefore more helpful to speak of the positional
aspects of goods. See generally Frank Pasquale, Technology, Competition, and Values, 9
MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH 607 (2007) (discussing positional aspects of goods); RICHARD
WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER EQUALITY MAKES SOCIETIES
STRONGER (2009) (discussing the negative consequences of positional competition).
68. See Robert H. Frank, Positional Externalities Cause Large and Preventable Welfare
Losses, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 137, 137 (2005); See generally ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING
THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS (1985); See generally
ROBERT H. FRANK, FALLING BEHIND: HOW INEQUALITY HARMS THE MIDDLE CLASS (2007);
ALAIN DE BOTTON, STATUS ANXIETY (2004) (discussing invidious consequences of excessive
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"defects" 69 of appearance like wrinkles become easier to hide, they become
less tolerable.7 ° Those who opt out of the cosmetic surgery arms race
become ever less attractive relative to the new normal.7 1 Entering the arms
race of looks is smart for one, but self-defeating collectively. Moreover, just
as expanded financing options and lower interest rates have driven up
housing prices, so too are new "beauty banks" putting surgery in reach of
more Americans. 72 Alex Kuczynski notes that "[m]ore than two-thirds of
Americans who now choose elective cosmetic surgery make less than
$50,000 a year., 73 While that may seem like a frivolous waste of money, it
may also be a necessary investment if many others in one's "looks cohort"
are trying to gain the perks due to relative pulchritude. As literature on
beauty and workplace competition suggests, those who do not get ahead in
the beauty race can be left behind when employers distribute raises.
74
concern about relative status).
69. NAOMI WOLF, THE BEAUTY MYTH: How IMAGES OF BEAUTY ARE USED AGAINST
WOMEN 231 (1991) (Noting that self-interest and sexism often play a critical role here: "You
could see the signs of female aging as diseased, especially if you had a vested interest in
making women to see them your way. Or you could see that if a woman is healthy she lives
to grow old; as she thrives, she reacts and speaks and shows emotion, and grows into her
face. Lines trace her thought and radiate from the comers of her eyes after decades of
laughter, closing together like fans as she smiles. You could call the lines a network of
'serious lesions,' or you could see that in a precise calligraphy, thought has etched marks of
concentration between her brows, and drawn across her forehead the horizontal creases of
surprise, delight, compassion, and good talk."). Though Wolf s vision may seem too lyrical
for a society conditioned by marketing to admire certain stereotyped forms of beauty, there
is at least some sign of backlash in Hollywood against the expressionless "Botox mask."
Johann Hari, Botox Mask is Destroying Hollywood Acting, THE INDEP. (London), Feb 7,
2008, at 40, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/johann-hari/botox-is-destroying-
holly b_173086.html ("[T]oday, most actors in most movies have deliberately paralyzed
faces, incapable of registering anything."); see also ALAIN DE BOTTON, How PROUST CAN
CHANGE YOUR LIFE (1997) (discussing rival views of Plato and Kant on beauty).
70. Pasquale, supra note 37, at 615 (describing how "badges of caste" have become
commodified). See also, SHEILA JEFFREYS, BEAUTY & MISOGYNY 172 (2005). (Noting
ubiquitous marketing featuring flawless models are one part of this process. "[H]armful
beauty practices are inscribed in culture and enforced on women in the west .... [because]
they have been constructed into major industries that make large fortunes for transnational
corporations and are a significant force in the global economy. The profitability of these
practices to the cosmetics, sex, fashion, advertising and medical industries creates a major
obstacle to women's ability to resist and eliminate them. There is so much money in these
industries based on commercializing harmful cultural practices that they constitute a massive
political force that requires the continuance of women's pain.").
71. Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REv. 1033, 1034
(2009) ("[C]onventional wisdom understates the advantages that attractiveness confers, the
costs of its pursuit, and the injustices that result. Many individuals pay a substantial price in
time, money, and physical health. Although discrimination based on appearance is by no
means our most serious form of bias, its impact is often far more invidious than we
suppose.").
72. KuCZYNSKi, supra note 62, at 120, 250.
73. Id. at 16.
74. Posting of Frank Pasquale to Madisonian.net, http://madisonian.net/archives/2006/
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B. Diverting Resources?
Few economists have chronicled the rise of this positional competition in
America as insightfully as Robert Frank. Twenty years ago, Frank's
groundbreaking Choosing the Right Pond7 5 focused on the importance of
status in everyday life, eloquently documenting what Sennett and Cobb
once termed the hidden injuries of class.76 Ten years later, in The Winner
Take All Society,77 Frank questioned the myths of merit so often used to
justify high levels of inequality. He showed how technology could
exponentially increase returns to superstars who were marginally (or
perhaps not at all) better performers than "also-rans." Frank's Luxury
Fever78 chronicled the disastrous effects of "spending cascades" unleashed
by the new inequality: as the near-rich strived to emulate the ever-wealthier
rich, so the middle class strived to emulate the near-rich, leading to
extraordinary levels of indebtedness as incomes stagnated for most middle
class households between the early 1970s and today.79 Each book developed
the theme of positional competition, which demonstrates the wasteful race
for goods that are valued to the extent others are denied them. 80
The diversion of resources in the case of cosmetic surgery not only
negatively affects individuals in the U.S., but also has global impacts. To
understand it, one must first review some facts about the supply of and
demand for medical personnel in the U.S. There is a growing consensus that
there is a shortage of doctors in the U.S.: physician salaries in the U.S. are
much higher than in comparable countries who are members of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 81 and
1 1/09/decomposing-pulchritudes-perks/ (Nov. 9, 2006); Harbour Fraser Hodder, Beauty's
Bounty, HARVARD MAGAZINE, Dec. 2006, at http://harvardmagazine.com/2006/l1/the-
beauty-bounty.html ("numerous studies have found that workers of above-average beauty
earn 5 to 15 percent more than those with below-average looks. Those differences are of a
similar order of magnitude as the premiums we associate with race and gender."); Rhode,
supra note 71, at 1034.
75. ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST
FOR STATUS (1985).
76. RICHARD SENNETT & JONATHAN COBB, HIDDEN INJURIES OF CLASS 3-6 (1993).
77. See ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILLIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY: WHY
THE FEW AT THE Top GET SO MUCH MORE THAN THE REST OF US (1995).
78. See generally ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER: MONEY AND HAPPINESS IN AN ERA
OF EXCESS (2000).
79. See Elizabeth Warren, The Middle Class on the Precipice, HARVARD MAG., Jan.-
Feb. 2006 at 28, available at http://www.harvardmagazine.com/on-line/010682.html.
80. See Posting of Frank Pasquale to http://madisonian.net/archives/2006/10/07/a-
sketch-of-my-paper-on-ppei/ (Oct. 7, 2006) (noting that the "aspiration to position" is a
"zero-sum game: one can only rise in position if others fall.").
81. Timothy Jost, Our Broken Health Care System and How to Fix It: An Essay on
Health Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 537, 606 (2006). Jost notes that:
Physician incomes are much higher in the United States than they are in
other OECD countries. In 1996, for example, the average U.S. physician
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even leading trade associations of doctors are calling for an increase in the
size of the medical work force. Having long predicted a surplus of
physicians, the Association of American Medical Colleges has reversed its
position, as reported in the Chronicle of Higher Education:
Instead of a glut, experts now fear the nation will face a serious shortage
of physicians just when the aging population will need them most. That
stunning about-face began in 2002 with an admission by the Association
of American Medical Colleges and other groups that the surplus
projections by health-care analysts and policy makers may have been a
mistake. "It is now evident that those predictions were in error," the
association stated last year in a report that called on medical schools to
increase their enrollments by 30 percent by 2015, both by expanding
existing schools and creating new ones.
The physician shortage is exacerbated by physician maldistribution.83
While the U.S. has fewer primary care doctors per capita than industrialized
countries like France and Germany, many experts say it has a surplus of
specialists.84 Young doctors' choice of specialization is often driven by
economic realities: the median primary care doctor's pay was around
$156,902 per year in 2003, compared to the median specialist's pay of
$264,375. 85 High medical education debt, rising malpractice premiums, and
income was $199,000, while the OECD median physician income was
$70,324. The ratio of the average income of U.S. physicians to average
employee compensation for the United States as a whole was about 5.5,
compared to Germany at 3.4, Canada at 3.2, Switzerland at 2.1, France at
1.9, and the United Kingdom at 1.4.
Id. See also BIANCA K. FROGNER & GERARD F. ANDERSON, MULTINATIONAL COMPARISONS
OF HEALTH SYSTEMS DATA 12 (2006), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/
media/Files/Publications/Chartbook/2006/Apr/Mutinationa%20Comparisons%2OoPo2OHe
alth%20Systems%20Data%20%202005/825_Frogner-multinational-comphltsysdata%20pdf
.pdf ("The United States spent almost three times the median OECD country on physician
services per capita in 2003."); Uwe E. Reinhardt, Peter S. Hussey & Gerard F. Anderson,
Cross-National Comparisons of Health Systems Using OECD Data, 21 HEALTH AFF. 169,
175 (2002) (discussing United States spending levels on physicians).
82. Mangan, supra note 46.
83. Katherine Huang, Graduate Medical Education: The Federal Government's
Opportunity to Shape the Nation's Physician Workforce, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 175, 176 (1999)
(describing how critics of physician workforce increases believe that an increased supply
will merely increase the number of specialists and exacerbate existing problems of access
and cost).
84. DEBORAH A. SULLIVAN, COSMETIC SURGERY: THE CUTTING EDGE OF COMMERCIAL
MEDICINE IN AMERICA 70-71 (2001). Sullivan notes that: "In 1996 only 11 percent of active
medical doctors reported a general or family practice and only 5 percent reported being
general surgeons. The rest work[ed] in more specialized areas, none of which account[ed]
for more than 6 percent of medical doctors, except for internal medicine (17 percent) and
pediatrics (7 percent). Id.
85. Atul Gawande, Piecework: Medicine's Money Problem, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 4,
2005, at 47 ("In 2003, the median income for primary-care physicians was $156,902. For
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the rising salaries of well-educated peers in banking and finance can make
the choice between specialization and primary care not much of a choice at
all. 86
Even before the rise of cosmetic surgery, specialties like dermatology
were particularly favored by aspiring doctors because of the relative ease of
the practice and the wealthy clientele they can attract. As the profit
potential of cosmetic surgery became clear, an economic logic similar to
that behind retainer care began to unfold. As the New York Times has
reported:
Five years ago, cosmetic medicine was primarily the domain of plastic
surgeons, facial surgeons and dermatologists - medical school graduates
who undergo several years of training in facial skin and its underlying
anatomy. But now, obstetricians, family practitioners, and emergency
room physicians are gravitating to the beauty business, lured by lucrative
cosmetic treatments that require same-day payments because they are not
covered by insurance and by a medical practice without bothersome
midnight emergency calls. 88
The new trend toward doctor-courtiers has raised difficult issues for
licensing boards. Though "all doctors with state medical licenses are
allowed to administer all kinds of treatments ... doctors have not
commonly set up shop in fields far outside their expertise.,, 89 Today,
business opportunities in cosmetic fields are changing that custom.9 ° The
general surgeons ... it was $264,375 .... ).
86. See Louis Uchitelle, Lure of Great Wealth Affects Career Choices, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
27, 2006, at 44, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/27/business/27richer.html?
ex= 1184731200&en=3df43ed89796adce&ei+5070 ("A decade into the practice of medicine,
still striving to become "a well regarded physician-scientist," Robert H. Glassman concluded
that he was not making enough money. So he answered an ad in the New England Journal of
Medicine from a business consulting firm hiring doctors. And today, after moving on to Wall
Street as an adviser on medical investments, he is a multimillionaire."); see also generally
ROBERT H. FRANK, FALLING BEHIND: How INEQUALITY HARMS THE MIDDLE CLASS 6-14, 43-
60 (2007) (describing the competitive pressure of the "rich" on the "near-rich" to earn more).
87. Posting of Frank Pasquale to CONCURRING OPINIONS,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/03/understandingt.html (Mar. 19, 2008)
("Understanding the Flight to Cosmetic Surgery") (citing Natasha Singer, For Top Medical
Students, an Attractive Field, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2008 at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/19/fashion/19beauty.html?R=l&scp= l&sq-dermatology
&st-nyt).
88. Natasha Singer, For Top Medical Students, an Attractive Field, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
19, 2008 at Al, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/19/fashion/19beauty.html?R=l&scp=
1&sq=dermatology&st=nyt).
89. Id. at Al ; See also Editorial, When the Joneses Can't Keep Up, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1,
2006, at A30 (describing the trend of the wealthy to continue seeking additional wealth).
90. See SULLIVAN, supra note 84, at 102-06 (chronicling the intraprofessional conflicts
that initially deterred entry into the plastic surgery field). However, a truce has gradually
emerged among the leading players that has essentially permitted a wide swathe of
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president of the American Board of Medical Specialties criticizes this
development, but one can expect it to accelerate as the demand for favored
appearance grows.91 While restrictions on enrollment in medical schools
may make it difficult to break into highly competitive dermatology or
cosmetic surgery residencies, once one is a doctor, little limits one's
opportunities to do lucrative cosmetic work.
9 2
As with concierge care, the importance of this trend is particularly
marked in the context of current debate over the size and distribution of the
medical workforce in the U.S. America imports more and more medical
personnel from less-developed countries. 93 Though the distributive effects
of medical tourism for cosmetic surgery are hotly contested,94 all parties can
likely agree it is unseemly for Americans demanding cosmetic procedures
abroad to create conditions that effectively divert doctors in poor regions
from addressing basic, local medical problems. When "resources are
increasingly allocated in response to profit opportunities rather than medical
need,' 95 those demanding cosmetic surgery merely speed up a positional
physicians to enter the market. Id.
91. See generally David Von Drehle, Looking Good, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2006, at
W14 (describing trends in the obsession with physical appearances).
92. See KuczyNsKJ, supra note 62, at 98. Kuczynski notes that "anyone with a medical
degree can hang a shingle on the door that says he or she practices cosmetic plastic
surgery.... And that's where the chilling economic beauty of cosmetic plastic surgery lies.
Because no insurance companies are involved in paying the bills, there is no approving body
involved in the transaction to demand credentials and certification-except the consumer,
who is probably a little scared, a little anxious, and a little predisposed to believe that only
good things will happen to them." Id.
93. Laurie Garrett, The Challenge of Global Health, 86 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 14, 15 (2007)
("[T]he world is now short well over four million health-care workers .... As the
populations of the developed countries are aging and coming to require ever more medical
attention, they are sucking away local health talent from developing countries. Already, one
out of five practicing physicians in the United States is foreign-trained, and a study recently
published in JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association estimated that if
current trends continue, by 2020 the United States could face a shortage of up to 800,000
nurses and 200,000 doctors. Unless it and other wealthy nations radically increase salaries
and domestic training programs for physicians and nurses, it is likely that within 15 years the
majority of workers staffing their hospitals will have been born and trained in poor and
middle-income countries. As such workers flood to the West, the developing world will
grow even more desperate.").
94. See Posting of Frank Pasquale to Concurring Opinions,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/02/dental vacation.html (Feb. 8, 2008)
(discussing the positive and negative effects of dental medical tourism on developing
countries' economies); See also Posting of Frank Pasquale to Concurring Opinions,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/10/medical-tourism.html (Oct. 30, 2007)
(discussing how American demand for discretionary procedures can affect the health
systems of other countries).
95. Robert Kuttner, Market-Based Failure - A Second Opinion on U.S. Health Care
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treadmill of appearance-enhancement while effectively diverting care from
the poor.
This diversion of care means that even superficially innocuous demand
for medical care can contribute to tragic consequences... Considered in
isolation, flawless teeth may be a harmless objective. However, once
contextualized as part of a larger market for scarce dental services, they are
exposed as promoting an important reallocation of societal resources.
Tempted by high incomes from cosmetic procedures, dentists are lured
away from meeting basic biomedical needs (such as the alleviation of
suffering) to serving artificial desires driven by competition and marketing.
This growing industry promotes the commoditization of appearance by
marketing and creating ever more unattainable standards.
Consider, for instance, recent controversies over the Medicaid
reimbursement rates for dental care. After a Maryland child died from an
abscessed tooth, 96 Congress investigated why his mother had such a
difficult time finding a dentist willing to treat him. As Harvard tax professor
Anne Alstott observed, "[i]n congressional testimony, one Maryland dentist
reported that his staff called 748 dentists listed as Medicaid providers and
found that only 23% would take new Medicaid patients. 97 Across the
nation, similar shortages have been reported. 98 Alstott further notes that
"[i]n 1999, Maryland's Medicaid payments for common dental procedures
ranged from 37% to 73% of the market rate; a 2000 state-by-state report by
the Government Accountability Office documents that such below-market
rates are the norm." 99 She therefore argues that states need to "pay dentists
who fix poor people's teeth the same rate they get for taking care of anyone
else. ' 100
More consistent and just reimbursement practices are a step toward
solving access problems. But the distribution of dentist incomes has become
bimodal, with higher income accruing to those concentrating on cosmetic
96. Mary Otto, For Want of a Dentist: Pr. George's Boy Dies After Bacteria From
Tooth Spread to Brain, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2007, at B01.
97. Anne Alstott, A Deadly Denial: When Medicaid Underpays Dentists, Poor Kids Pay
the Price, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jun. 24, 2007, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/
sharedcontent/dws/dn/opinion/points/stories/DN-alstott-24edi.ART.State.Editionl.43 f494.
html.
98. Alex Berenson, Boom Times for Dentists, But Not for Americans' Teeth, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 11, 2007, at Al ("[M]any poor and lower-middle-class families do not receive adequate
care, in part because most dentists want customers who can pay cash or have private
insurance, and they do not accept Medicaid patients. As a result, publicly supported dental
clinics have months-long waiting lists even for people who need major surgery for decayed
teeth.... Meanwhile, the American Dental Association does not support opening new dental
schools or otherwise increasing the number of dentists. The association says it sees no
nationwide shortage of dentists.").
99. Alstott, supra note 97.
100. Id.
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procedures. 0 1 More dentists are serving this higher-end market, leaving the
rest behind. If wealthy persons pay dentists thousands of dollars for
removing flecks from their teeth, these dentists may not need to work the
rest of the day-whatever the Medicaid reimbursement rate is. 10 2 As the
number of millionaires skyrockets (there were over nine million in the US
in 2007), this dynamic intensifies. 10 3 The luxury can even turn into a
necessity, as those who cannot pay for some forms of cosmetic dentistry are
efficiently identified as belonging to the lower classes of society.
104
Alstott suggests that there is a set market price for dental procedures,
which government must meet. However, the price of services depends on
the buying power of those in the market for dental care and dentists' income
targets.10 5 Those with means may endlessly win a bidding war against those
reliant on government payments-even if they demand relatively trivial
procedures compared with the desperate needs of the poor. As inequality
increases, the expected value of a career serving the higher economic class
may appear much higher than one concerned with serving the poor and
middle classes.
These dilemmas evidence a nexus between commodification and
inequality. To the extent the time of medical professionals is allocated
according to professional or medical norms, the more grotesque features of
pure market allocation may be resisted. Conversely, to the extent medical
101. FRANK & COOK, supra note 77, at 89, 96-97 (discussing bimodal distribution of
dentist incomes).
102. June Thomas, The American Way of Dentistry: Healthy Teeth for All, SLATE, Oct.
4, 2009, at http://www.slate.com/id/2229637 ("[L]ow fees and bothersome paperwork aren't
the only reasons dentists avoid Medicaid patients. Letting people with bad teeth, often from
lower socioeconomic backgrounds, into their waiting rooms risks upsetting dentists' full-fee
patients. But under the current market conditions (undersupply of dentists, high demand for
services), it seems unlikely that anything short of a massive influx of funds into the Medicaid
system will cause a change of heart."). Thomas also documents "dentists' growing
inclination to work fewer hours." June Thomas, The American Way of Dentistry: The
Disappearing Dentist, SLATE, Sept. 28, 2009, at http://www.slate.com/id/2229631.
103. See Robert Frank, Why Richistan? Why Now?, http://blogs.wsj.com/wealth/2007/
06/05/why-richistan-why-now/ (June 5, 2007, 12:32 EST) (chronicling the rise of millionaire
households and communities).
104. See posting of Frank Pasquale, to CONCURRING OPINIONS,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/03/the death-spira.html (Mar. 26, 2007,
23:12 EST) (discussing a self-reinforcing cycle of poverty and lack of opportunity for health
benefits; as individuals become sicker, they become less employable; as they become less
employable, they are less able to afford health care; as they are less able to afford health
care, they become sicker).
105. Thomas, supra note 102 ("dental students get their training in clinics run-and paid
for-by the universities .... Prestigious universities have been especially keen to divert
resources away from dental education to programs that attract rather than bleed funds....
The shortage is compounded by dentists' growing inclination to work fewer hours. In 2006,
12.1 percent of the nation's private-practitioner dentists worked fewer than 30 hours per
week.").
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professionals' time is frankly commodified and distributed according to
ability-to-pay, one's rank in the distribution of income becomes
increasingly important to health status. 10 6 The rationing power of money is
ubiquitous.
IV. FRACTAL INEQUALITY'S INTERNATIONAL IMPACT
One solution to access problems in the U.S. is the importation of
physician services from abroad. Economist Dean Baker has argued for freer
trade in services, so that foreign doctors can immigrate to the U.S. and offer
lower priced care.10 7 Other scholars have observed that rising health costs in
the U.S. may lead Americans to travel abroad for medical care. 108 While
each proposal would probably lead to savings for many U.S. patients, 10 9
they could have drastic consequences for less developed countries. Given
global patterns of fractal inequality, wealthy Americans' diversion of
medical personnel from the care of the lower and middle classes in this
country can, in turn, lead to the diversion of medical personnel away from
the needy in less developed countries. Only a stringent regulatory regime
could reliably assure that gains from trade ultimately lead to better care for
all.
106. See RICHARD WILKINSON, MIND THE GAP: HIERARCHIES, HEALTH, AND HUMAN
EVOLUTION 19 (2001) ("Inequality kills. Both rich and poor die younger in countries with the
greatest inequalities in income. Countries such as the United States with big gaps between
rich and poor have higher death rates than those with smaller gaps such as Sweden and
Japan."). Wilkinson explains how inequality can lead to a "chronic state of anxiety," and
then explores the "main biological process through which chronic anxiety leads to ill-
health." Id. at 37.
107. DEAN BAKER, THE CONSERVATIVE NANNY STATE 14 (2006) (demonstrating that
"protectionist barriers that keep out foreign professionals are actually quite extensive").
Baker argues that "Doctors in the United States earn an average of more than $180,000 a
year. Their counterparts in Europe earn less than $80,000 a year. Doctors in the developing
world earn considerably less. If enough doctors can be brought in from the developing world
to bring doctors' pay down to the European level, the savings to consumers would be $80
billion a year, about $700 per family per year." Id. at 21.
108. Michael Klaus, Outsourcing Vital Operations: What If U.S. Health Care Costs
Drive Patients Overseas for Surgery?, 9 QUINNiPiAc HEALTH L.J. 219, 221-22 (2006);
Nicolas P. Terry, Under-Regulated Healthcare Phenomena in a Flat World: Medical
Tourism and Outsourcing, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 421, 421-27 (2007).
109. Dean Baker, Malpractice, BOSTON REviEw May/June 2009, at 31, available at
http://bostonreview.net/BR34.3/baker.php ("The health care sector can be opened to global
competition in three obvious ways: increasing opportunities for foreign-born medical
personnel to work in the United States; facilitating 'medical tourism,' so that Americans can
more easily have major medical procedures performed in other countries; and allowing
Medicare beneficiaries to buy into the lower-cost health care systems of other wealthy
countries. Each of these offers enormous opportunities for savings in the health care sector
and benefits for the economy."). But see Arnold Milstein & Mark Smith, Will the Surgical
World Become Flat?: Americans' Seeking Cheaper Surgical Procedures Abroad Will
Provide Only Modest Relieffrom our Spreading Affordability Problem, 26 HEALTH AFF. 137,
141 (2007).
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A. International Service Flows
Rising health care costs have led many Americans to look abroad for
medical treatments. For example, as the cost of ordinary dental care rises, 1l
"dental vacations" have become part of a larger trend toward medical
tourism."' Globalization and international trade in services raise many
important questions for policymakers.'
1 12
According to some scholars of medical tourism, spending by the
developed world can stimulate the growth of health infrastructure in the
developing world. 113 Yet medical tourism also threatens to push the
diversionary effect of inequality to new levels. 114 For example, the
110. June Thomas, The Oral Cost Spiral, SLATE, Sept. 29, 2009, at
http://www.slate.com/id/2229632 (charting dental price index that has risen at nearly twice
the rate as the consumer price index over the past twenty years).
111. Camille Sweeney, More Fun Than Root Canals? It's the Dental Vacation, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2008, at G1. ("Roughly half a million Americans sought medical care abroad
in 2006, of which 40 percent were dental tourists, according to the National Coalition on
Health Care, an alliance of more than 70 organizations. That's up from an estimated 150,000
in 2004, said Renee-Marie Stephano, the chief operating officer for the Medical Tourism
Association, a nonprofit organization that researches global health care.").
112. Nathan Cortez, Patients without Borders: The Emerging Global Market for
Patients and the Evolution of Modern Health Care, 83 IND. L.J. 71, 131 (2008). ("[M]edical
tourism foreshadows the diverse set of issues we will have to confront as health care
continues to globalize. How will globalization affect health care costs, quality, and access?
Where does the free market fail? When is government regulation futile? How do
governments retain the jurisdiction to respond to important legal and ethical questions? How
can multilateralism facilitate trade without eviscerating local authorities' jurisdiction? How
do patients, companies, and policymakers mitigate the risks... ?"); See also Philip Mirrer-
Singer, Medical Malpractice Overseas: The Legal Uncertainty Surrounding Medical
Tourism, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211, 212 (2007).
113. MILICA Z. BOOKMAN AND KARLA R. BOOKMAN, MEDICAL TOURISM IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 177-178 (Palgrave Press, 2007) ("Medical tourism... can improve and expand
public health care .... The entire country benefits from highly skilled doctors who stay in
their countries to partake in the growing medical tourism industry."). But see Debora Lipson,
quoted in ABC Radio National Background Briefing on Medical Tourism, Feb. 20, 2005, at
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/talks/bbing/stories/sl308505.htm ("There is no question that there
is a tremendous amount of commercial interest driving this trend, rather than health care
interests that are interested in providing greater access and equity and financing to people
across all income levels .... There are great claims made about how the economic benefits,
even if they are at least serving the rich, will trickle down to the poor, or that for example,
government health care programs will be able to better target the existing resources that they
do have, to the poor and the needy. Quite frankly, I haven't seen that happen anywhere. It's
just not the case that those profits are tapped and redirected to health services for the poor, it
just does not happen.").
114. Interview by David Williams with Milica Bookman, Author of MEDICAL TOURiSM
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Sept. 21, 2007), http://www.worldhealthcareblog.org/2007/09/
21/interview-with-milica-bookman-author-of-medical-tourism-in-developing-countries-
transcript/ ("[There is an] effect of decreasing resources for the poor population.., because
hospitals and doctors and everybody involved in the medical field is going to want to go into
the more lucrative medicine[;] namely medicine for ... cash-paying foreigners. The
government might also experience distortion of its priorities because [of the prospect of]
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government of South Korea aggressively promoted cosmetic surgery
services so it could become a center of excellence in that field, drawing
patients from across Asia.1 15 Other doctors complained that their own fields
lacked applicants because of the push.1 16 Additionally, in poorer countries
like Malaysia, scholars have observed the "emergence of a dual medical
structure" whereby "private hospitals have about 20% of the overall bed
capacity in the country but.., hire 54% of the doctors," thus producing a
"crowding out effect." 117
When Americans are not traveling abroad to demand the services of less
developed countries' doctors, they and other citizens of rich nations are
often inducing those doctors to emigrate to the developed world.18 For
example, extreme wealth disparities mean that many Filipino physicians
make more in the U.S. as nurses than they would in their home country
working as doctors.119 The United States currently imports a great number
bringing in... foreign currency.").
115. Blaine Harden, Assembly Required - In Seoul's 'Makeover Town,' Surgeons
Struggle To Keep Up With Demand for Faces as Seen on TV, WASH. POST., Sept. 30, 2007,
at A20 ("[A]ccording to the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the number of plastic surgeons
[in South Korea] jumped 45 percent between 2000 and 2005, from 926 to 1,344.").
116. Id. "Medical school officials say high pay is luring more and more young doctors
into plastic surgery. 'It is quite amazing how many residents are abandoning specialties like
internal medicine and pathology to jump on the plastic surgeon bandwagon.. .'[said one
doctor]." Id.
117. Bookman interview with Williams, supra note 114; BOOKMAN AND BOOKMAN,
supra note 113, at 177 ("The dual medical system exists not just between rich and poor
patients, but also between urban and rural regions.").
118. Laurie Garrett, The Challenge of Global Health, 86 FOREIGN AFF., 14, 15 (2007)
("[T]he fact that the world is now short well over four million health-care workers .... As
the populations of the developed countries are aging and coming to require ever more
medical attention, they are sucking away local health talent from developing countries.
Already, one out of five practicing physicians in the United States is foreign-trained, and a
study recently published in JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association
estimated that if current trends continue, by 2020 the United States could face a shortage of
up to 800,000 nurses and 200,000 doctors. Unless it and other wealthy nations radically
increase salaries and domestic training programs for physicians and nurses, it is likely that
within 15 years the majority of workers staffing their hospitals will have been born and
trained in poor and middle-income countries. As such workers flood to the West, the
developing world will grow even more desperate.").
119. Celia Dugger, U.S. Plan to Lure Nurses May Hurt Poor Nations, N.Y. TIMES, May
24, 2006, at Al. See also Garrett, supra note 118, at 28 ("Data from international migration-
tracking organizations show that health professionals from poor countries worldwide are
increasingly abandoning their homes and their professions to take menial jobs in wealthy
countries. Morale is low all over the developing world, where doctors and nurses have the
knowledge to save lives but lack the tools. Where AIDS and drug-resistant TB now bum
through populations like forest fires, health-care workers say that the absence of medicines
and other supplies leaves them feeling more like hospice and mortuary workers than
healers."); Celia Dugger, Educated Workers Leaving Poor Nations, Survey Finds, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 24, 2005, at A5 ("[S]ome experts worry that the flight of skilled, educated
workers from poor countries could be crippling in particular professions, especially in health
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of physicians from foreign countries. 120 Current regulation is not adequately
addressing the brain drain that results from this labor migration. 121
As of 2002, about 23%, or roughly 180,000 United States physicians,
were graduates of international medical schools. 122 Not all of them come
from developing countries, and even those who do may never have intended
to practice in the country in which they were educated. Nevertheless,
American efforts to draw international medical graduates (IMGs) have
created serious concerns in many countries. 123 For example, Liberia has lost
43% of its physician workforce to the United States and Canada.
124
Strikingly, the United Nations estimates that the "brain drain" costs Africa
$4 billion a year (nearly one-third of the official development aid that
Africa receives). 125
Global justice may require some reversal of these trends, but limits on
IMGs could inflict further access problems on the poorest segments of the
U.S. population. Many rural and urban areas in the U.S. face serious
physician shortages. They draw many of the foreign physicians who
and education."). But see Michele R. Pistone, The Devil in the Details: How Specific Should
Catholic Social Thought Be?, VILL. UNIV. SCH. L. WORKING PAPER, available at http://law.
bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1028&context-villanovalwps (questioning the
negative effects of emigration of medical professionals, and asking "What if new
developments in technology and communications enabled highly skilled immigrants to
contribute to the growth of their home countries even while abroad? ... Does the money sent
as remittances by migrants to their family and friends who remain back home stimulate the
national economic growth of the home countries in addition to increasing the standard of
living of the individual recipients?").
120. Amy Hagopian, et al., The Migration of Physicians from Sub-Saharan Africa to the
United States of America: Measures of the African Brain Drain, 2:17 HUM. RESOuRCES
HEALTH 1 (2004), available at http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/pdf/1478-
4491-2-17.pdf.
121. The Lancet, Medical Migration and Inequity of Health Care, 356 THE LANCET 177
(2000).
122. Id. at 4. This amounts to roughly 180,000 American physicians.
123. For example, while Ghana's population faces many medical challenges, 65% of the
country's medical graduates immigrate to the U.S. within ten years of graduating from
Ghanaian medical schools. Ghana's Health Care Sector is in Crisis, MODERN GHANA NEWS,
Apr. 29, 2003, available at http://www.modernghana.com/news/34096/1/ghanas-health-
sector-is-in-crisis-gma.html ("The Ghana Medical Association (GMA) on Sunday said the
nation's health sector was in crisis [in part because of the].., wholesale recruitment of
health professionals by agencies and Ghanaians living abroad for commission." The GMA is
reported to believe that "unless the government took concrete actions and pragmatic
measures to meet the situation and rectify the imbalances in the system the country would
soon experience a disaster in the sector."). See also Suwit Wibulpolprasert, Cha-aim
Pachanee, Siriwan Piayarangsarit, & Pintusorn Hempisut, International Service Trade and
its Implications for Human Resources for Health: A Case Study of Thailand, 2 HUMAN
RESOURCES FOR HEALTH 10, 17 (2004), available at http://www.human-resources-
health.com/content/2/1/10.
124. Hagopian et al., supra note 120, at 5.
125. Id. at 2-4.
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emigrate to the US. The dmigr6s' crucial role has led states to request
special visa exceptions to retain foreign physicians in underserved areas and
many safety net hospitals employ IMG residents. 126 The entry of IMGs into
American graduate medical education thus presents a health policy
dilemma.
Legal and political decisions crucially influence the composition of the
U.S. physician workforce. In 1986, Congress authorized the COGME "to
provide an ongoing assessment of physician workforce trends and to
recommend appropriate Federal and private sector policy efforts to address
physician workforce concerns. 12 7 Graduate medical education, which is
largely funded by Medicare, only has a finite number of spots.1 28 There are
more residency spots available than there are U.S. medical graduates
(USMGs); international medical graduates fill most of the remaining spots.
129 COGME offers advice to Congress and the Department of Health and
Human Services on "the status of foreign medical school graduates in the
United States."'13 In the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress reduced
Medicare funding for the residency positions for IMGs in inner-city
hospitals, largely in order to reduce Medicare spending, and also to avoid
physician-induced demand for physician services.
31
This approach may have reduced the U.S. demand for IMGs, but at the
expense of many of the most vulnerable US citizens. A more targeted
approach might involve taxing the earnings of immigrant physicians to pay
for a health care infrastructure that could better support their services in
their home countries. Many IMGs leave their home country not merely to
earn more abroad, but also to practice skills with technology and experts
that are in short supply in their home countries. Taxation could smooth a
transition to a future scenario where U.S. hospitals both educate more
physicians and help finance more equitable health infrastructure
internationally.
126. Hagopian et al., supra note 120, at 2. It is presently unclear whether foreign
physicians tend to stay as safety-net practices for poor and underinsured Americans;
however, they appear to be an important "stopgap" in many regions. Id.
127. David A. Kindig, Federal Regulation and Market Forces in Physician Workforce
Management, in THE U.S. HEALTH WORKFORCE: POWER, POLITICS, AND POLICY 48 (Marian
Osterweis et al. eds., 1996).
128. John K. Iglehart, The Quandary Over Graduates of Foreign Medical Schools in the
United States, 334 HEALTH POL'Y REP. 1679, 1679 (1996).
129. Hagopian et al., supra note 120, at 2.
130. Hagopian et al., supra note 120, at 2, 49 (noting that COGME's role is only
advisory; despite its 1992 recommendations to reduce the number of residency positions to
110% of USMG's, the number stood at 140% in 1994."); Kindig, supra note 119, at 47-48,
51.
131. Hagopian et al., supra note 120, at 9.
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B. International Organ Markets
Many scholars have called for the development of markets for
transplantable organs. For example, Eugene Volokh argues that a "right of
medical self-defense ... makes [an] organ sales ban presumptively
improper and unconstitutional when the organs are needed to protect
people's lives."132 But he concedes that "some concerns about organ
markets may justify regulation of such markets."133 Although "allowing
payment for organs [might] let rich patients buy up all available organs, and
leave poorer patients without the chance of a transplant," 134 he believes that
a price ceiling could address these issues:
The "rich outbidding others" concem only arises if the rich or their
insurers pay so much that other health care funders can't keep up, and the
other funders' payments don't suffice to make enough organs available
for all patients. Even if we think this is likely-if we think the rich would
pay $200,000 per kidney, other health care funders wouldn't pay more
than $100,000, and this payment wouldn't yield enough organs for
everyone-this ... supports capping payments at the level all funders
would pay, which is likely the rather high amount at which the funders
will still be saving money by paying for an organ to be transplanted
rather than for long-term care in lieu of a transplant.
135
As I have noted in the context of ventilator allocations during
pandemics, 136 this type of subsidy can be a perfectly reasonable approach to
the distributive issues involved within a given country. But while Volokh
wants to analogize the decision to donate an organ to the decision to take on
difficult, dirty, or dangerous work, 137 international fractal inequality creates
some important differences between these choices.1 38
132. Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and
Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1816 (2007).
133. Id. (Volokh calls the right to purchase kidneys a legal imperative, other
commentators have focused on making the moral case for commodification of organs.). See
Stephen J. Dubner & Steven D. Levitt, Flesh Trade, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2006, § 6
(Magazine), at 20 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/09/magazine/
09wwln freak.html.
134. Id. at 1839.
135. Id. at 1840.
136. Posting of Frank Pasquale to Concurring Opinions, http://concurringopinions.com/
archives/2006/03/dedicatedventi.html (Mar. 13, 2006).
137. Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/archives/
archive 2006 11 12-2006 11 18.shtml (Nov. 13, 2006).
138. See generally DEEN K. CHATTERJEE, THE ETHICS OF ASSISTANCE: MORALITY AND
THE DISTANT NEEDY (2004); PETER K. UNGER, LIVING HIGH AND LETTING DIE: OUR ILLUSION
OF INNOCENCE (1996); Peter Singer, Why You Should Give Away Most of Your Money, 76
MED. ECON. 275 (1999), available at http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/memag/
PracticeManagement/ArticleStandard/article/detail/124725 (arguing that morally, all
[Vol. 19
Access to Medicine in an Era of Fractal Inequality
Job safety regulations and minimum wage laws within the U.S. help
discourage workers from making truly bad bargains as they choose
occupations. The reasonableness of the options discussed by Volokh is
premised on the idea that a would-be organ seller has a choice between a
dangerous job that allows him to save "$5000 per year" or selling a kidney
for tens of thousands of dollars. 139 As this news report shows, the choice
can be much more grim in less developed regions:
"We do this because of our poverty," said [one paid organ donor from] a
village in eastern Pakistan. A kidney nets the donor $2,500, sometimes
less than half that amount, while recipients - some 2,000 a year - pay
$6,000 to $12,000, compared with $70,000 in neighboring China. Critics
blame an economic system that enmeshes farmers in chronic debt,
forcing them to sell their kidneys, and say the trade should be banned.
The government says it is taking action. In the United States, donating
kidneys for money is banned. But the Belgium-based International
Society of Nephrology has suggested expanding the pool of kidney
donors by legalizing payment of about $40,000 to donors.
To safeguard against abuse, those in desperate circumstances should be
given some fair compensation for risking their lives on behalf of a person
capable of paying them for an organ. If an organ market develops further,
the direct tradeoff of risk for cash makes it an ideal place to transmute anti-
commodification norms into the egalitarian commitments that are their
ultimate normative rationale. 141 Price floors can help do that, but must be
keyed to the real risk involved. Organ markets should not permit some
individuals to take advantage of the extreme deprivation of others.
42
V. TAXING FRACTAL INEQUALITY
As Part III has demonstrated, inequality of life chances within a
particular country can often pale in comparison with inequality between
countries. As in a suspended mobile, the addition or subtraction of any
discretionary income should be given away to the poor); Peter Singer, Who Deserves the
9/11 Cash Pile?, SLATE, Dec. 12, 2001, http://slate.msn.com/?id=2059690; see generally
GARRETT CULLITY, THE MORAL DEMANDS OF AFFLUENCE (2004).
139. Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/archives/
archive_2006 11 12-2006 11 18.shtml (Nov. 13, 2006).
140. Poor Pakistanis Sell Their Kidneys for Cash, MSNBC.coM, Nov. 12, 2006,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15690989/.
141. Posting of Frank Pasquale to Madisonian, http://madisonian.net/archives/2006/07/
18/anti-commodification-principles-as-egalitarian-leverage/ (July 18, 2006).
142. For a dark vision of the problems that could arise here, see Michael Burton, Future
Farm, http://www.michael-burton.co.uk/HTML/future-farm text.htm (last visited April 20,
2009). In his art installation, Burton envisions a future where individuals use certain body
parts to grow biomaterials for the wealthy. Id.
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amount of buying power at one point affects the balance of the whole. 143 In
response to these disparities in buying power, many proposals for taxing the
high end of medical consumption to subsidize the low end have arisen.
Targeted taxation can promote "difference principled" tiering. 144 Under
this theory, subtle, targeted taxation can prove more effective than blunt
bans or complex regulatory conditions designed to diminish the purchasing
power of the well off. Such taxation ought to apply to the many medical
interventions and insurance products that enhance health to the point of
making individuals "better than well" or provide a level of access to
therapeutic care clearly superior to prevailing standards of care. Difference
principled taxation may help bridge the gap between haves and have-nots
both within and among different countries.
Legal economists have long advocated replacing restrictive regulation
with taxation designed to provide a basic minimum of care. According to
the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice report on
health care, Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition:
Competition cannot provide resources to those who lack them; it does not
work well when certain facilities are expected to use higher profits in
certain areas to cross-subsidize uncompensated care. In general, it is more
efficient to provide subsidies directly to those who should receive
them... [to ensure transparency]. 145
In response to reasoning like this, some states are forsaking redistributive
regulation for a more direct approach. They permit niche providers and
cosmetic surgery to flourish, but require these high-end providers to
allocate some of their revenues to traditional providers.
There are many critics who question the wisdom of using revenues from
one part of the health care system to subsidize other parts. Most believe that
a basic level of health care should be provided by the state for all. However,
given the ubiquity of anti-taxation rhetoric, "user-based, selective tax
proposals are more palatable than broader ones" for many legislators. 146
143. The mobile metaphor is developed by Roger Boesche. Roger Boesche, Why Could
Tocqueville Predict So Well?, 11(1) POLITICAL THEORY 79, 83 (1983).
144. This type of tiering is named for Rawl's A Theory of Justice famed "difference
principle" which stipulates that any increase in inequality is acceptable to the extent it raises
the welfare of the least well off. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 61 (1971) (explaining
that the difference principle is the "intuitive idea ... that the social order is not to establish
and secure the more attractive prospects of those better off unless doing so is to the
advantage of those less fortunate.").
145. FED. TRADE COMM'N & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF
COMPETITION 23 (2004).
146. Lloyd de Vries, Putting the 'Vanity' in Vanity Tax, CBS NEWS, Jan. 28, 2005,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/01/28/national/main670058.shtml (quoting Bert
Waisaner, tax policy analyst for the National Conference of State Legislatures); see also
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Such health-industry based taxation also forces various parts of the medical
and insurance establishments to pay for their own past opposition to
universal coverage and the cost-containment measures it entails. 147 Finally,
taxing tiering is an approach designed to permit consumers to make their
own decisions about the value of health care and to allow practitioners
freedom to gravitate to practice areas where they feel best able to add value
(while still respecting their broader obligations to the public).
In the case of cosmetic surgery, the case for taxation is clear-cut. Direct
efforts to regulate or end cosmetic surgery implicate philosophical divides
over the value of attractiveness, the proper role of medicine, and the moral
standing of enhancement relative to therapy. A tax can reflect a broader
range of values than a flat ban: some see a tax as primarily aimed at cross-
subsidization, while others view it as a way of deterring an activity they
find objectionable. Taxation may provide an opportunity for "d6tente"
between those with radically different values.1 48 Whatever their concerns
about the worth of cosmetic surgery, some egalitarians may even welcome
it if it ultimately subsidizes health care for the least well-off.149 The
economics of innovation developed in the field of intellectual property also
suggest a positive role for taxation of tiering in the therapeutic health fields;
better care for the best-off can eventually diffuse more generally.
1 50
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING
INHERITED WEALTH 4 (2005) (describing opposition to certain general taxes); see also
JONATHAN CHAIT, THE BIG CON (2007) (describing anti-tax fervor stoked by supply-side
economics).
147. See Theodore R. Marmor & Jonathan Oberlander, Paths to Universal Health
Insurance: Progressive Lessons From the Past for the Future, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 205, 206
(2004) (discussing opposition of professional associations to single-payer plans); Theodore
R. Marmor, The Politics of Universal Health Insurance: Lessons from the Past?, 4 J.
INTERDISC. HIST., 671, 672 (1996) (documenting historical attempts to establish universal
health care and the politics that caused its failure).
148. See Cass R. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 2867,
2881 (2007) (discussing "modus vivendi" and incompletely theorized agreements).
149. See Posting of Frank Pasquale to Concurring Opinions,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/03/dedicated venti.html (Mar. 13, 2006)
(describing how to create incentives for the rich to voluntarily subsidize the poor); Frank
Pasquale, Two Concepts of Immortality: Refraining Public Debate on Stem-Cell Research,
14 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 73, 116-17 (2002).
150. See Posting of Frank Pasquale to Concurring Opinions,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/02/badlysocialize.html (Apr. 6, 2009)
(comparing diffusion in pharmaceuticals and health care generally); Merrill Goozner,
Innovation in Biomedicine: Can Stem Cell Research Lead the Way to Affordability? 3 PLoS
MEDICINE 611 (2006), available at http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/
journal.pmed.0030126. But see James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis,
Price Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REv. 2007, 2038-39
(2000) (arguing that only price discrimination can prevent welfare loss); Michael J. Meurer,
Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45
BUFF. L. REv. 845, 869 (1997) (noting that in the ideal case of price discrimination, each
customer is charged her "maximum willingness to pay for the items she purchases.");
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Taxation of tiering can be carefully adjusted to take into account the
social usefulness of an activity. It can even be micro-targeted to take into
account the relative value of different aspects of an activity. For example, in
my past work on retainer medicine, I advocated the taxation of queue-
jumping and amenity-bundling, but not preventive care, because such care
is not adequately provided in the U.S. today.151 Similarly, specialty
hospitals merit much less severe taxation than cosmetic procedures: they
focus on meeting basic health needs while the latter overwhelmingly
amounts to a diversion of medical personnel to non-medical ends. The
discussion below starts with an analysis of extant taxation of cosmetic
surgery (Section A), then recommends fine-tuning of taxation based on the
theory I advanced in Three Faces of Retainer Care (Section B).
A. Vanity Taxes
New Jersey adopted a vanity tax in 2004 levied on "any medical
procedure performed on [an] individual which is directed at improving
[his/her] appearance and which does not meaningfully promote the proper
function of the body or prevent or treat illness or disease. 152 The tax is 6%
of gross revenues of cosmetic surgery practices 153 and carefully draws a
distinction between reconstructive and cosmetic procedures. 15 4 The U.S.
Senate considered adding such a tax to health care reform proposals in
2009,155 and many states have considered similar measures. 156 State Senator
Karen Keiser upped the redistributive ante in Washington State, offering a
Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDoZO L. REV. 55, 70
(2001) (describing the prevelance of third-degree price discrimination in copyright
dependent industries).
151. The Three Faces ofRetainer Care, supra note 39, at 42.
152. Cosmetic Medical Procedure Tax, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:32E-1 (West 2006).
153. § 54:32E-l(a) (West 2006) ("There is imposed and shall be paid a tax of 6% on the
gross receipts from a cosmetic medical procedure, which shall be paid by the subject of the
cosmetic medical procedure, and which shall be collected from the procedure subject by the
person billing the gross receipts from the cosmetic medical procedure when collecting the
payment for the cosmetic medical procedure. If more than one person bills gross receipts
from a single cosmetic medical procedure, each person shall be responsible for the collection
of the gross receipts tax on the portion of the gross receipts billed.").
154. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:32E-1(b) (West 2006) ("'Cosmetic medical procedure' does
not include reconstructive surgery or dentistry.").
155. Bob Mook, Unkindest Cut: Tax Proposed on Cosmetic Surgery, DENVER BUsNESS
JOURNAL, Dec. 4, 2009, at http://www.bizjoumals.com/denver/stories/2009/12/07/
storyl.html?b=1260162000%5E2536591 ("Senate Democratic leaders [proposed] a 5
percent tax on elective cosmetic procedures to generate $5 billion in the next 10 years to help
pay for a $849 billion plan to overhaul the nation's health care system.").
156. See Michael D. Ruel, Comment, Vanity Tax- How New Jersey Has Opened
Pandora's Box by Elevating its Moral Judgment about Cosmetic Surgery without
Consideration of Fair Health Care Policy, 28 J. LEG. MED. 119, 126 (2007).
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plan to earmark vanity tax revenue for health insurance for poor children.
157
Such a plan was also proposed in Illinois, with proceeds to benefit both
medical research and access to basic medical care.
158
Cosmetic surgery is objectionable for many reasons: it sparks positional
competitions for appearance, diverts medical resources to non-medical
ends, and endangers lives. 159 Nevertheless, advocates of a "vanity tax" can
expect stiff opposition from those who profit on cosmetic procedures. The
cosmetic surgery lobby's talking points include the idea that the tax is anti-
woman, as 87% of cosmetic procedures are purchased by women. 160 In a
critique of the tax, Michael Ruel argues that it is sexist and such surgery is
frequently nondiscretionary. 161 On such a view, those who discriminate
against the plain or unattractive have no obligation to reform their
prejudiced attitudes; rather, it is the burden of the unattractive to meet the
discriminators' standards.
The more a given condition is perceived as remediable, the less that
condition is accepted in society as a whole. 162 Aesthetic standards tend to
ratchet upward, and what was once an effort to distinguish oneself can
become de rigeur to the point that not doing it can become the new
abnormal. Women's advocates have been noticeably cool toward cosmetic
surgeons' efforts to "protect" them; as the National Organization for
Women's (NOW) president Kim Gandy has stated, "[i]n general, I'm
opposed to most things that impact women disproportionately, but
disproportionate use isn't a good [m]easure if a tax is unfair or not. I can't
imagine someone arguing against having a luxury tax on yachts because
157. Id. at 127-28.
158. Id. at 128.
159. Pasquale, supra note 37, at 607 ("Certain technologies merit special monitoring
because they promote the leveraging of economic advantage into social or cultural advantage
without substantially increasing overall social welfare.").
160. Ruel, supra note 156, at 119 (citing AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLASTIC SURGEONS,
2004 Gender Quick Facts: Cosmetic Procedures 1 (2005)); Press Release, Am. Soc'y of
Plastic Surgeons, Am. Soc'ty of Plastic Surgeons (ASPS) Opposes Cosmetic Surgery &
Physician Taxes, (Jan. 31, 2005).
161. Ruel, supra note 156, at 133 ("Women can either feel inferior, enjoy a lower
quality of life, and be rejected by mainstream society, or else suffer the pain and toil of
cosmetic surgery to achieve the exact same ideals society uses to reject them.").
162. See Margaret Olivia Little, Cosmetic Surgery, Suspect Norms and the Ethics of
Complicity, in ENHANCING HUMAN TRAITS 162 (Erik Parens, ed., 1998) (while being short is
tolerated, protruding ears are seen as remediable and less readily tolerated); William Saletan,
The Belly and the Blade; The Surgical War on Fat, SLATE, May 26, 2009,
http://www.slate.com/id/2219033/ (explaining the effectiveness of bariatric surgery and the
cost of obesity, and concluding "So look out, fat folks. As we learn more about the
intractability of your condition, the good news is that people may stop expecting you to diet
or exercise your way to a thinner body. The bad news is, they may start expecting you to go
under the knife.").
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more of them are bought by men." 163 Other feminists have identified
cosmetic surgery as "coercion... camouflaged by the language of choice,
fulfillment, and liberation. " ' 64 Anthony Elliott has noted that "the flipside of
today's reinvention craze is fear of personal disposability. ' 165 We should
interrogate the conditions under which these choices are made, not assume
them.
Ruel has also criticized the tax more generally claiming that increased
attractiveness significantly improves the lives of those who possess it.
166
Citing Deborah Sullivan's Cosmetic Surgery: The Cutting Edge of
Commercial Medicine in America, he claims:
Higher levels of attractiveness correlate to increased life satisfaction, less
stress, perceived competency, and a positive balance of everyday life.
Therefore, "the more attractive a person is, the more competent and in
control of their lives they feel, affirming the attractiveness
stereotype."... [G]ood-looking workers generally eam 5% to 10% more• . 167
in income and hold more prestigious positions.
Ruel thus argues vanity taxes unfairly discourage the appearance-
challenged from laying claim to these very real human goods. 168 He claims
that improved appearance both a) gives individuals a "competitive edge" in
various contexts and b) makes them subjectively more satisfied with their
lives. 169 But neither of these goals outweigh the advantages of a tax, and the
"vanity tax" may even promote the latter.
163. Marisa Meltzer, Vanity Tax? - Man the Barricades!, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, at
6, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9406E3D8123FF935A25753
C1A9639C8B63.
164. Kathryn Pauly Morgan, Women and the Knife: Cosmetic Surgery and the
Colonization of Women's Bodies, in WOMEN, MEDICINE, ETHICS AND THE LAW 40 (S.
Sherwin & B. Parish eds., 2002). See also Melanie Latham, The Shape of Things to Come:
Feminism, Regulation, and Cosmetic Surgery, 16 MED. L. REV. 437,437 (2008) (describing a
range of feminist responses).
165. ANTHONY ELLIOTT, MAKING THE CUT: How COSMETIC SURGERY IS TRANSFORMING
OUR LIVES 145 (2008). Elliott attributes the appeal of cosmetic surgery to larger economic
trends. Id, at 9. "[T]he new economy spawned by globalization intrudes traumatically in the
emotional lives of people - with many scrambling to adjust to today's routine corporate
redundancies.... [C]orporate layoffs, downsizings and offshorings are affecting people's
sense of identity, life and work.... Many have reacted to this sense of social dislocation and
economic insecurity - what I term today's pervasive sense of ambient fear - by turning to
forms of extreme reinvention in general and cosmetic surgical culture in particular. Many are
calculating that a freshly purchased face-lift or suctioning of fat through liposuction is the
best route to improved lives, careers and relationships." Id.
166. Ruel, supra note 156, at 123-24.
167. Ruel, supra note 156, at 123-24 (quoting DEBORAH SULLIVAN, COSMETIC SURGERY:
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Ruel assumes that if more people become more attractive, all will share
in the "advantages" once enjoyed only by the appearance-favored. 170 He
neglects to address the distributional and positional aspects of advantage.
171
The role of enhanced appearance has been modeled by economist Robert
Frank, who sees it as a classic example of a positional good (one whose
value, far from being inherent, directly derives from its comparison with
others). 172 The appearance game is zero-sum; some move up only by
pushing others down by comparison.
What about the subjective dimensions of Ruel's claim? We might first
question whether vanity should be given any weight in a utilitarian calculus.
But perhaps the very relativity of attractiveness makes taxation of
appearance-enhancement extraordinarily efficient. Consider Yew-Kwang
Ng's work on diamond goods: 173 Ng studied goods that are valued not
necessarily for their intrinsic beauty or worth but for their ability to show
off one's wealth. 174 People have a set "diamond budget," and it doesn't
really matter if 10% or 90% of that goes to the government or DeBeers. If
the same logic applies to physical appearance enhancement, the tax might
leave all better off.
B. Taxing Tiering Generally
While taxation for tiering may appear attractive when it is concerned
with elective medical treatment such as cosmetic surgery, it is more
controversial in other contexts. In a recent article, journalist Sarah Lyall
discussed the tensions between public provision and private markets in the
170. See id at 123-25.
171. See, e.g., JONATHAN WOLFF & AVNER DE-SHALIT, DISADVANTAGE 21 (2007)
(describing how any theory of disadvantage needs to "allow us to identify the least
advantaged, and, ideally, to place each member of society on a scale of relative advantage
and disadvantage, as well as being able to identify absolute disadvantage."). Assume, for
instance, that three associates at a law firm are bald (A, B, and C), and one has a full head of
hair (D). Only one can make partner, and all have equal performance records and client
contacts. D eventually gets the job on the basis of his presumed higher level of attractiveness
to clients. Now assume that C gets surgical hair implants, to "level the playing field"
between him and D. It is far from likely that the firm will suddenly decide to make two
partnerships available rather than one. The same logic applies to less dramatic allocations of
earning power or professional advance. Of course, positional competitions can develop
among many different axes; associates may also compete by billing more hours, developing
their legal skills, or wooing clients. Note, though, that each of these strategies for success
objectively increases the efficiency of the firm and increases the likelihood of expansion of
the ultimate "prize," be it higher pay, more partnerships, or more complex work.
172. Robert H. Frank, Positional Externalities Cause Large and Preventable Welfare
Losses, 95 AM. EcoN. REV. 137, 137 (2005).
173. Richard Dusansky, Comment, Diamonds Are a Government's Best Friend: Burden-
Free Taxes on Goods Valuedfor Their Values,79 AM. ECON. REV. 1285, 1285 (1989).
174. Id
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United Kingdom. 175 Lyall focused on the case of a breast cancer patient
who wanted to use Avastin, a new anti-cancer drug. 176 The National Health
Service (NHS) provided most of her care, but would not pay the $120,000
needed for Avastin. 177 The patient was prepared to sell her house to
purchase the medicine, but then the NHS said that her choice to "go
private" for the cancer drug would render her ineligible for NHS coverage
of the other care she needed. 178 Explaining such a policy, the health
secretary, Alan Johnson, said:
Patients "cannot, in one episode of treatment, be treated on the N.H.S.
and then allowed, as part of the same episode and the same treatment, to
pay money for more drugs." Officials said that allowing Mrs. Hirst and
others like her to pay for extra drugs to supplement government care
would violate the philosophy of the health service by giving richer
patients an unfair advantage over poorer ones.
179
Note that the NHS is not actually denying her care-rather, it is refusing
to pay for the care she receives. There are some good reasons for the NHS
to manage the interaction of public and private plans, which even the
famously market-friendly U.S. has recognized in its limits on "balance
billing" in the Medicare context. In the U.S., doctors who try to bill
Medicare patients above the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) guidelines of treatment costs are prevented from doing so by
balance billing rules.180 These rules arose out of concerns about potential
barriers to access to care for poor and lower middle class Medicare
beneficiaries.181 Without such rules, physicians could condition services to
Medicare patients on the payment of additional charges that would
undermine the programs' efforts to provide reasonably-priced health care to
all. Under Medicare balance billing rules, participating physicians' charges
are limited by the fee schedule prescribed by the program. 182 Physicians
who accept assigned claims are prohibited "from charging more than the
Medicare fee schedule amount." 183 Physicians who "do not accept
assignment are prohibited from charging more than 115% of the fee
175. Sarah Lyall, Paying Patients Test British Health Care System, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21,






180. Brennan, supra note 39, at 1166.
181. Id.
182. The Three Faces of Retainer Care, supra note 39, at 57.
183, Id.
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schedule amount."'1 84
Should the principles behind a balance billing rule be extended from
physician services to technologies and drugs like Avastin? Given the
artificial scarcity of doctors' services mentioned above, laws restricting
combination of private and public funds for medical services may be more
appropriate than those relating to drugs. Some of the money paid for
cutting-edge treatments like Avastin will fund pharmaceutical research.
Perhaps it is the case that the private-paying patient is driving up the cost of
the drug, particularly if it is very difficult to make. This may well be the
case with Avastin, as it is part of a class of biotechnology (monoclonal
antibodies) that is generally more difficult to replicate than the average
pill. 185 Even if that is the case, however, the current investment in the drug
may well lead to better technology for its replicability.
When we turn from technology to services, different economic dynamics
emerge. Physician supply is relatively fixed. Both right-leaning Milton
Friedman 186 and left-leaning Dean Baker1 87 have portrayed physician
licensing rules as cartel-like; others might accept the AMA's insistence that
only a relatively small group of people are sufficiently smart and dedicated
to become doctors. Whatever one's take on the legitimacy of physician
licensing, it limits the number of doctors in a manner that is not responsive
to price. Thus, when someone pays $250 for a private consultation to "jump
the queue" of patients waiting to see a physician, they are not likely
contributing to a process that will lead more doctors to be licensed. The
number of licenses granted is a political, not an economic, decision.
More empirical and sociological research must be done to examine the
full range of effects of "top-up" payments for care. Perhaps doctors in
Britain are willing to work more to do private consultations, and won't
effectively substitute out NHS patients for private patients when the latter
pay more. 188 Some drugs' effectiveness may be severely diminished by the
184. Id.
185. For background on biotech drugs, see Patricia Seliger Keenan, Peter J. Neumann,
Kathryn A. Phillips, Biotechnology and Medicare's New Technology Policy: Lessons From
Three Case Studies, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 5, 1260 (2006), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/25/5/1260.
186. Keith B. Leffler, Physician Licensure: Competition and Monopoly in American
Medicine, 21 J. L. &EcoN. 165, 166 (1978).
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need." Kuttner, supra note 95, at 549-50. Kuttner examines a "false economy" of market
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time they reach the public domain. For example, Kevin Outterson notes that
while the developed world's research on antibiotics is a great service to the
rest of globe, its frequent overuse of antibiotics during their patent terms
could render them much less useful over time (due to antibiotic
resistance). 189 Moreover, critics like Shannon Brownlee and Maggie Mahar
have said that the U.S. has far too many diagnostic machines, leading to
overtreatment and overspending on medical technology. 190
In theory, there is more reason to be concerned about medical services
being disproportionately commandeered by the relatively well-off than
there is with respect to drugs and technology. Markets can create incentives
for innovation and investment in the latter field, and physician licensing
rules make it much harder to do so in the former. Nevertheless, more
empirical research in each field is necessary in order to assess the full
impact of fractal inequality on access to care and medicine.
VI. CONCLUSION
Every decent society strives to provide a social minimum: a basic level
of food, shelter, and health care assured to even its poorest members. Health
law attempts to enact this idea of a social minimum, both domestically and
globally. In the U.S., the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act of 1986 requires hospital emergency rooms which receive federal
funding to screen and stabilize anyone who arrives with a serious condition.
Medicaid and charity care requirements assure some level of access to
health care for the indigent. Internationally, some intellectual property laws
governing pharmaceuticals grant poor countries the right to compulsorily
license lifesaving drugs in times of emergency.
There are also "ceilings" of care designed to assure that certain types of
health care or health enhancement are unavailable, expensive, or taxed.
Organ purchases and genetic engineering are largely banned, and bodily
enhancements such as steroids and cosmetic surgery (along with cognitive
enhancements such as mood-normalizing and mind-concentrating drugs)
are subject to regulation. Many scholars predict that cutting-edge
regenerative medicine could greatly extend its patients' lifetimes. If such
incentives that appear better designed to motivate focus on the wealthiest and healthiest
patients than to achieve real cost-control. For example, "some [doctors] defect to 'boutique
medicine,' in which well-to-do patients pay a premium, physicians maintain good incomes,
and both get leisurely consultation time. It's a convenient solution, but only for the very
affluent and their doctors, and it increases overall medical outlays." Id. at 551.
189. Outterson, supra note 5, at 67-68. As Outterson observes, "[a]ntibiotic resistance
may be compared to running on a treadmill. R&D is learning how to run faster; conservation
is slowing the treadmill down." Id. at 69.
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medical care is prohibitively expensive for the vast majority of persons,
should it be permitted? Or is there something grotesque about a social order
that grants wealthy individuals lifetimes that are twice or three times as
long as those who cannot afford such therapies? As such innovations
develop, none should be considered in isolation from its overall effect on
public health.
Over twenty years ago, Enthoven and Kronick described the "paradoxes
of excess and deprivation" in the American health care system. 191 Since
then, its reticulated inequalities have not only intensified but have also
spilled over into other countries via "brain drains," medical tourism, and
underground organ markets. 192 In an era of fractal inequality, struggles for
egalitarian redistribution within nation-states can have unexpectedly
inegalitarian effects on international patterns of access. 193 Preserving a
social minimum within the U.S. and abroad will depend on creative and
context-sensitive systems of taxation that reallocate resources from those
with the highest buying power to those whom they consistently outbid for
access to care. In situations of exponential inequality, exponentially
progressive taxation may well be necessary to remedy disparities in
purchasing power. 
194
Traditional economic analysis may not be much help when policymakers
address fractal inequality. Economic analysis is often unapologetically
functionalist: as Hirschman described its origins in the doux commerce
school, one of its basic ideas is the prevalence of mutual gains from trade
given comparative advantage. 195 Gains from trade become the foundation of
an economic order that promises increasing GDP, health status, and
comfort. This story has broadly described much of North American,
Western European, and Asian development. But what happens when critical
resources-such as oil, timber, or wheat-are in short supply? As Malthusian
concerns arise, which countries continue to grow, and which stop? Given
how quickly general technological superiority can be converted into
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military superiority, the stakes here are very high. Zero-sum games limit the
utility of classic characterizations of market efficiency.
Functionalists tend to explain how all parts of a given social order fit
together in a self-regulating order, like the organs within a body. By
contrast, conflict theories focus on times of crisis and change, underscoring
the ways in which different classes, professional groups, ethnic groups or
states challenge one another for scarce material or symbolic resources.
Zero-sum contests for influence and power remain prevalent within our
social world, and cause particular concern in the health care sector. A
relatively fixed supply of doctors can mean that any group that uses its
buying power to purchase disproportionately time-consuming (and often
unnecessary) medical attention threatens to divert care from those with less
purchasing power. Fractal inequality of income and wealth forces us to
reconsider the relationship between markets and health care. If high levels
of inequality persist, policymakers will need to reinforce the redistributive
aspects of health care law.
